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PATENT FRAUD
David 0. Taylor*
Several recent judicial opinions suggest that patent law's inequitable conduct
doctrine is broken. These opinions indicate that-despite its admirable objective of
encouraging disclosure of important information to the Patent Office-the
inequitable conduct defense is being overused by alleged infringers in patent
litigation to the detriment of the public. This overuse creates problems. First, it
encourages overdisclosure of information to the Patent Office. In extreme cases,
overdisclosure makes it difficult for patent examiners to identify information critical
to deciding whether to issue patents, potentially resulting in the issuance of invalid
patents. Second, overuse of the inequitable conduct defense unnecessarily increases
costs associated with enforcement of patents. Costs to inventors, to the court system,
and ultimately to the public itself all increase dramatically with each allegation of
inequitable conduct These problems with the inequitable conduct doctrine threaten
the very purpose articulated in the patent clause in the Constitution-the promotion
of the progress of science and useful arts. This Article analyzes the inequitable
conduct doctrine and proposes a reform that would alleviate its present problems.
"Patent fraud" should replace the current doctrine of inequitable conduct
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When inventors fail to provide relevant information to the Patent Office, they
may be barred from enforcing their patent in court. Specifically, accused infringers
may assert the defense of inequitable conduct to a patentee's enforcement claim.
The specter of this defense encourages inventors to disclose information to the
Patent Office. Yet its overuse creates numerous problems. It leads to
overdisclosure of information, often causing critical information to be hidden like
a needle in a haystack; patent examiners at the Patent Office waste time filtering
through unimportant information and-in the worst case scenario-altogether
overlook critical information, allowing invalid patents to issue. In addition, each
allegation of inequitable conduct increases the cost of litigation on both parties
and courts, distracts the trier of fact from the merits of other issues like
infringement and validity, and takes a serious toll on the reputation of inventors,
patent attorneys, and the patent system itself. In short, the Constitutional purpose
of patents-"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"'-is thwarted
while the costs to the public pile up.
Reformation of the inequitable conduct doctrine to address and correct these
problems is long overdue. Several recent judicial opinions suggest that patent
law's inequitable conduct doctrine is broken.2 Congress currently is considering
the first significant reform to the patent laws in over fifty-five years, and the
Supreme Court has heard only five cases even remotely related to the inequitable
conduct doctrine in the last seventy-five years-the last one forty-five years ago.3
The time has come to reform the inequitable conduct defense. This year an en
banc panel of the Federal Circuit will be reassessing its precedent governing the
inequitable conduct defense.4 This Article analyzes the purposes of the inequitable
conduct defense, studies the problems associated with enforcing it in its current
form, sets forth various proposals to reform the inequitable conduct defense, and
1. U.S. CONsT. art. 1. § 8, cl. 8.
2. See Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1342-44 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(Linn, J., concurring) (discussing problems with deceptive intent test); Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar
Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349-53 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (criticizing overly broad
use of deceptive intent test); McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 926-27
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for finding deceptive intent without clear
and convincing evidence); Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1195-1205 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing need for objective standard when determining deceptive intent).
3. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175-80 (1965)
(discussing whether fraud in patent procurement can constitute violation of section 2 of Sherman Act);
Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 318-20 (1949) (per curiam) (discussing whether patent attorney
committed gross misconduct); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
814-20 (1945) (discussing whether plaintiff in patent case had unclean hands as it knew of alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations in defendant's patent application); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244-51 (1944) (deciding whether circuit court had power to overturn district
court judgment after evidence of fraud surfaced), overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18-19 (1976); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-
47 (1933) (discussing scope of clean hands doctrine in patent cases).
4. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 374 Fed. Appx. 35, 35-36 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (granting en banc rehearing).
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suggests that any reform should refocus the inequitable conduct defense on what
could be called "patent fraud."s
Part II of this Article considers the issue of information asymmetry between
patent applicants and the Patent Office and two of patent law's responses to that
problem-the duty of candor and good faith and the inequitable conduct defense.
Part III presents various problems associated with the current law governing the
inequitable conduct defense-including the "plague" of allegations and the tolls of
those allegations-and examines several recent opinions highlighting these
problems. Part IV proposes and analyzes significant reforms to the inequitable
conduct defense, including focusing on the prevention of "patent fraud" by
utilizing heightened evidentiary thresholds. Part V examines the ability and
appropriateness of Congress, the Patent Office, district courts, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court to adopt various reforms
to the inequitable conduct defense.
II. THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DEFENSE
In light of the information asymmetry between patent applicants and the
Patent Office, the Patent Office and the courts have placed on patent applicants a
duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office. One mechanism to
enforce this duty of candor and good faith-and, thus, to correct for the
information asymmetry between patent applicants and the Patent Office-is the
defense of inequitable conduct, which can be alleged in litigation in response to a
charge of patent infringement 6
5. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the meaning of "patent fraud," which I use to refer to a new
defense to a charge of patent infringement-a modified version of the current inequitable conduct
defense-that requires, inter alia, knowledge or intent regarding a highly material misrepresentation or
omission. The phrase "patent fraud," however, is not new. See, e.g., Colortronic Reinhard & Co. v. Plastic
Controls, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 259, 260 n.1 (D. Mass. 1980) (noting that in certain circumstances a patent
applicant may commit "patent fraud (pun intended)"), aff'd in part, 668 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).
6. Other mechanisms to enforce the duty of candor and good faith through litigation include claims
brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(2006), administrative proceedings brought by the Federal Trade Commission under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006), and state tort law claims, such as unfair competition and
tortuous interference with contractual relations. See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc.,
153 F.3d 1318, 1334-37 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (allowing state law claim of unfair competition to proceed even
where underlying cause of action involved alleged invalidity of patent), overruled on other grounds,
Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Dow Chem. Co. v.
Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1473-79 (Fed Cir. 1998) (allowing plaintiff to litigate claim for intentional
interference with contractual relations insofar as claim involved inequitable conduct relating to
underlying patent); Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 167 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(noting that section 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act may apply to claims involving inequitable
conduct in patent procurement); Lemelson v. Wang Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 430,432-34 (D. Mass. 1994)
(allowing RICO claim to be asserted against party who extorted settlements through pattern of litigation
based on fraudulently obtained patents). Outside of litigation, the Patent Office has the ability to enforce
the duty of candor and good faith through disciplinary proceedings against registered patent attorneys
and patent agents. E.g., Kingsland, 338 U.S. at 318-20; Klein v. Peterson, 866 F.2d 412, 416-17 (Fed. Cir.
1989); Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053, 1059-61 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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A. Information Asymmetry at the Patent Office
Information asymmetry exists between patent applicants7 and the Patent
Office. At first blush this may not be apparent, in part due to the vast number of
patent applications handled by the Patent Office each year. The reality, however, is
that patent applicants often possess more and better information concerning their
own entitlements to patents than the Patent Office.8
On the one hand, by their very nature, patent applications often-but
certainly not always 9-disclose cutting-edge technology on the forefront of
scientific exploration and engineering innovation.10 On the other hand, "there is
nothing new under the sun."" Indeed, "[m]ost inventions arise from a
combination of old elements and each element may often be found in the prior
art."12
Patent applicants-particularly inventors-undoubtedly have the best
knowledge and understanding of their own inventions. They have better
information regarding their own date of invention,13 circumstances that might bar
their own entitlement to a patent,14 and the completeness and accuracy of
information submitted to the Patent Office in support of arguments for
patentability. They have information regarding sales of products and publications
7. As used herein, patent applicant refers to any person subject to the duty of candor and good
faith. The Patent Office applies the duty of candor and good faith to "[e]ach individual associated with
the filing and prosecution ofa patent application." 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2009).
8. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[T]he patent practice
includes recognition that the inventor usually knows more about the field than does the 'expert' patent
examiner.").
9. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 abstract (filed Nov. 17, 2000) (disclosing a "method of
swinging on a swing" by "induc[ing] side to side motion by pulling alternately on one chain and then the
other"); U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 abstract (filed Nov. 2, 1993) (disclosing a "method for inducing cats to
exercise" by "directing a beam of invisible light produced by a hand-held laser apparatus onto the floor
or wall or other opaque surface in the vicinity of the cat, then moving the laser so as to cause the bright
pattern of light to move in an irregular way fascinating to cats, and to any other animal with a chase
instinct").
10. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 1,647 (filed Apr. 7, 1838) (Samuel Morse's patent on the telegraph);
U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Nov. 4, 1879) (Thomas Edison's patent on the incandescent light bulb).
11. Ecclesiastes 1:9.
12. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977,986 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
13. Identifying the date of invention in any particular case may depend on various factors
including: (1) the date of conception; (2) the date the invention was "reduced to practice" either actually
(building a working device) or constructively (filing a patent application describing the invention); (3)
any diligence between the date of conception and the date the invention was "reduced to practice"; and
(4) corroboration of the foregoing. See Thomas L. Irving & Stacy D. Lewis, Proving a Date of Invention
and Infringement After GATTITRIPS, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 309, 325-31 (1994) (discussing factors underlying
determination of date of invention and who was first to invent).
14. An inventor's right to a patent is barred when "the invention was patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). While
the Patent Office is the repository for U.S. patents, the ability of a patent examiner to find every U.S. and
foreign patent, let alone every printed publication, is unlikely. Furthermore, knowledge regarding
possible barring activities in the form of public uses and sales is particularly unique to patent applicants.
PATENT FRAUD 532010]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
of industry articles that predate their invention and on which their inventions
build upon and. improve.' 5 In patent law, these prior products and industry
publications are called "prior art."16
The Patent Office, by contrast, often does not possess a wealth of knowledge
and information regarding cutting-edge technology and prior art.'7 The Patent
Office is not filled with experts that wear hard hats to test new mechanical
devices, goggles to experiment with new chemical reagents, and rubber gloves to
assess new surgical methods.'8 The Patent Office is filled with bureaucrats-called
examiners' 9-that make significant, often subjective, decisions concerning the
patentability of technology based almost solely on written correspondence with
patent applicants.20
Moreover, knowledgeable third parties-for the most part-are shut out of
the patent prosecution 2' process and cannot lend their knowledge and
information to the Patent Office to improve its ability to analyze patent
applications and arguments submitted by patent applicants seeking to convince
examiners to issue patents. 22 The prosecution of patent applications at the Patent
Office is primarily an ex parte activity-one that involves only the patent
15. See supra note 14 for a discussion of conditions that preclude entitlement to a patent. In
addition to these barring activities, inventors are not entitled to patents for various other reasons,
including if "the invention was known or used by others in this country... or patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent."
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
16. The Patent Act defines what is and what is not prior art. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102.
17. For example, the Patent Office has been criticized for its lack of resources to analyze
applications for so-called "business method" patents. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Kuester & Lawrence E.
Thompson, Risks Associated with Restricting Business Method and E-Commerce Patents, 17 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 657, 668 (2001) ("[B]oth sides of the business method patent debate agree that one of the main
problems with the current system for examination of business method patents is the state of the prior
art databases.").
18. See General Information Concerning Patents, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/#models (last revised January 2005) ("Models or
exhibits are not required in most patent applications since the description of the invention in the
specification and the drawings must be sufficiently full, clear, and complete and capable of being
understood to disclose the invention without the aid of a model.").
19. This is not to denigrate examiners. Indeed, examiners follow a proud line that began with
Thomas Jefferson, the first patent examiner in the United States. Ronald D. Hantman, Doctrine of
Equivalents, 70 1. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 511, 513 (1988) ("lefferson might be considered both the
first Commissioner of Patents and the first patent examiner.").
20. By rule, every interaction with the Patent Office must be reflected in a document 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.2 (2009) ("All business with the Patent and Trademark Office should be transacted in writing.").
21. "Prosecution" of patent applications refers to all aspects of the process of applying to the
Patent Office to obtain a patent, including corresponding with the Patent Office, in an attempt to
convince the Patent Office that an application meets all requirements necessary to obtain a patent.
22. There are narrow exceptions. For example, within the first two months after the publication of
a patent application, any interested third party may submit prior art in the form of patents and printed
publications to the Patent Office. 37 C.F.R. § 1.99. Any submission, however, "shall not include any
explanation of the patents or publications, or any other information" such as prior art in the form of
prior sales of products. Id. § 199(d). Furthermore, any such submission is "limited to ten total patents or
publications." Id.
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applicant and the Patent Office, not third parties.23 Moreover, patent prosecution
takes place secretly, at least-typically-for the first eighteen months after a
patent application is filed.24
This confluence of factors can lead to stark imbalances in the amount and
quality of information known to patent applicants and the Patent Office, not to
mention the imbalance of incentives between patent applicants and examiners to
search for the most relevant prior art.25 As a result, the Patent Office and courts
have created a duty of candor and good faith that seeks to address and correct this
information asymmetry.
B. The Duty of Candor and Good Faith
In light of the information asymmetry inherent in the patent application
process, the Patent Office and the courts have placed on each patent applicant a
duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Patent Office. The Patent Office
explains this duty in what is known as "Rule 56."
Prior to 1992,26 Rule 56 imposed a "duty of candor and good faith" that
included a "duty to disclose ... information [patent applicants] are aware of which
is material to the examination of the application."27 Rule 56 explained that
"information is material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the
application to issue as a patent."28 This standard for materiality is known as the
"reasonable examiner" standard.
23. One exception is inter partes reexamination. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-18 (2006).
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (discussing confidentiality of patent applicants and noting that-in absence
of request from applicant-applications are not published until passage of eighteen months).
25. [Tlhe proceeding before the patent office is not adversary and is dependent upon
examination by an official who may not equal in resources those who are in the field
commercially, and who does not have the extra spark of an economic incentive to avoid the
tribute or other restraint that may be exacted by a patentee.
Turzillo v. P & Z Mergentime, 532 F.2d 1393, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
26. The Patent Office enacted the earliest version of Rule 56 in 1949. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1949).
Around that time, Rule 56 "prohibited fraud but said nothing about inequitable conduct" Robert J.
Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 53
(1993).
27. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991). Prior to 1992, Rule 56(a) recited:
A duty of candor and good faith toward the [Patent] Office rests on the inventor, on each
attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application and on every other individual
who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application and who is
associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation
to assign the application. All such individuals have a duty to disclose to the Office information
they are aware of which is material to the examination of the application. Such information is
material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent The duty is






After a "concerted effort to change the standard of materiality,"29 the Patent
Office amended Rule 56 in 1992.30 The modified version of Rule 56 still includes a
"duty of candor and good faith," although the "duty to disclose" now refers to "all
information known [to the patent applicant] to be material to patentability."31
While this difference in language is slight-focusing on importance to
"patentability" instead of to the "examination of the application"-the definition of
when information is "material to patentability" is very different:
[I]nformation is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to
information already of record or being made of record in the
application, and
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other
information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes
in:
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the
Office, or
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the
information compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the
preponderance of evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term
in the claim its broadest reasonable construction consistent with the
specification, and before any consideration is given to evidence which
may be submitted in an attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of
patentability.32
This detailed, technical standard for materiality is referred to as the "modern"
materiality standard, the "post-1992" materiality standard, or simply the "new
Rule 56 materiality standard."
A concept expressed in the new Rule 56 materiality standard is
cumulativeness; information is material to patentability when it is not cumulative
to information in the application, and it either contributes to a prima facie case of
unpatentability or is at least inconsistent with one of the applicant's positions
29. Goldman, supra note 26, at 88.
30. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1992). Since 2002, Rule 56(a) has recited:
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest The public interest is best served,
and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at the time an application is being
examined, the [Patent] Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all information
material to patentability. Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent
application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a
duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to
patentability as defined in this section.... [N]o patent will be granted on an application in
connection with which fraud on the [Patent] Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of
disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct.
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009).
31. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
32. Id. § 1.56(b).
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before the Patent Office.33 Stated conversely, information is not material to
patentability when it is cumulative to information considered by the Patent Office.
As one example, cumulativeness refers to the situation where information teaches
no more than what a reasonable examiner would consider to be taught by prior
art already before the Patent Office. 34 The Patent Office's pre-1992 "reasonable
examiner" standard did not expressly include the concept of cumulativeness, but
the concept of cumulativeness existed before the Patent Office incorporated it into
the post-1992 materiality standard.3 5
The Supreme Court long ago expressed its agreement with the Patent Office's
view that "the relationship of attorneys to the Patent Office requires the highest
degree of candor and good faith."3 6 The Court also has explained why the law
places this duty of candor and good faith on patent applicants:
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. As
recognized by the Constitution, it is a special privilege designed to serve
the public purpose of promoting the "Progress of Science and useful
Arts." At the same time, a patent is an exception to the general rule
against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open market.
The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent,
therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent
monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other
inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their
legitimate scope.37
The Court, on the one hand, recognized the Constitutional purpose of patents-to
promote the "Progress of Science and useful Arts" 3 8-and, on the other hand,
recognized the far-reaching social and economic consequences of patents,
including the certain restrictions patents place on the use of inventions and the
potential for monopolies. In view of these consequences, the Court stressed the
"paramount interest" in seeing that patents are "kept within their legitimate
scope."39 This concern with granting patents only when appropriate justifies
imposing the duty of disclosure on patent applicants. This duty seeks to ensure
that the Patent Office considers the patentability of patent applications in light of
the most relevant information available to the patent applicant.
33. Id.
34. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly& Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
35. Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Star
Scientific, Inc. v. R.I. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Scripps Clinic &
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds,
Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp.,
925 F.2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
36. Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318,319 (1949).
37. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945). "Those who
have applications pending with the Patent Office or who are parties to Patent Office proceedings have an
uncompromising duty to report to it all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying
the applications in issue." Id. at 818.
38. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
39. Precision Instrument Mfg., 324 U.S. at 816.
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C. The Inequitable Conduct Defense
While it is important to understand that the law imposes a duty of candor
and good faith and a duty of disclosure on patent applicants, it is even more
important to understand how these duties are enforced. One mechanism to
enforce the duty of candor and good faith and the duty of disclosure is the
inequitable conduct defense, which can be alleged in litigation in response to a
claim of patent infringement. Two aspects of the inequitable conduct defense-
explored below-include the evidentiary standard currently required to prove
inequitable conduct and the remedies currently available when inequitable
conduct is proven. These aspects of the inequitable conduct defense will be
revisited when the topic of this Article turns toward reform of the current law of
inequitable conduct.
1. Evidentiary Standard for Proving Inequitable Conduct
To prove inequitable conduct, courts generally have required (1) a "showing
that the information that was misrepresented to or withheld from the [Patent
Office] was material" and (2) a "showing of wrongfulness, such as deceptive intent,
willful misconduct, or gross negligence."4 0 To understand the evidentiary standard
governing the inequitable conduct defense, it is helpful to focus separately on
these two parts of the doctrine, namely its materiality and state of mind
requirements.
a. Materiality Required to Prove Inequitable Conduct
Over time, various standards have emerged to determine whether
information is material for purposes of proving inequitable conduct. These
standards can be put into five categories: (1) a "subjective but for" standard; (2)
an "objective but for" standard; (3) a "but it may have" standard; (4) the
reasonable examiner standard; and (5) the modern Rule 56 standard.4 '
Originally, "neither the Supreme Court nor the [Patent Office] articulated
exactly what constituted a material misrepresentation."42 Three materiality
standards, however, emerged in early court decisions on inequitable conduct: the
"subjective but for" standard, which requires that the information actually caused
the examiner to issue the patent when the examiner would not otherwise have
done so; the "objective but for" standard, which requires that information be so
material that the patent should not have issued; and the "but it may have"
40. Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
41. The concept of cumulativeness likely applies with respect to some, but not all, of the five
materiality standards applicable to the inequitable conduct defense. In particular, cumulativeness is a
relevant consideration with respect to the "but may have," "reasonable examiner," and post-1992
materiality standards, and is likely a relevant consideration with respect to the "subjective but for"
standard. However, it is probably not applicable to the "objective but for" standard.
42. Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315.
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standard, which requires that the information may have influenced the
examiner.43
The Patent Office eventually articulated two materiality standards in Rule 56.
As discussed above, prior to 1992 the Patent Office's Rule 56 included the
"reasonable examiner" standard for materiality." This standard is strikingly
similar to the "but it may have" standard. 45 In 1992, however, the Patent Office
adopted the modern Rule 56 standard recited above. 46 The modern Rule 56
standard, by contrast, is unlike any of the materiality standards articulated in the
case law.
The Federal Circuit, which since 1982 has had exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over cases arising under the patent laws, 47 has held that neither the early nor the
more recent Rule 56 standard for materiality "supplant[s] or replace[s]" the
standards identified in the case law.48 Significantly, however, it has recognized
that the "reasonable examiner" standard is broader than the three standards
originally articulated by courts and yet has nevertheless approved its use in
analyzing inequitable conduct defenses.49 Thus, the court effectively has
concluded that the "reasonable examiner" standard is the threshold standard for
purposes of the materiality prong of the inequitable conduct defense.50 This
threshold degree of materiality must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.51
b. State of Mind Required for Inequitable Conduct
Federal Circuit cases consistently state that the state of mind required to
establish inequitable conduct is "intent to deceive."52 Intent to deceive, however,
43. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1314.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006); see also Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,
535 U.S. 826, 829-34 (2002) (discussing Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over patent cases).
48. Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1316.
49. Id. In a bit of an understatement, the court also recognized that the Patent Office's post-1992
materiality standard is "arguably narrower" than its pre-1992 materiality standard. Id.
50. The Federal Circuit justified its holding that the reasonable examiner standard is the threshold
materiality standard for the inequitable conduct defense by indicating that "to the extent that one
standard requires a higher showing of materiality than another standard, the requisite finding of intent
may be lower." Id. See infra Part II.C.1.c for a discussion of the concept of balancing materiality and state
of mind.
51. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
52. See, e.g., Rentrop v. Spectranetics Corp., 550 F.3d 1112, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Intent need not
be proven by direct evidence; it is usually inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the
conduct at issue."); Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 999 (Fed. Cir.
2007) ("A breach of this duty-including affirmative misrepresentations of material facts, failure to
disclose material information, or submission of false material information-coupled with an intent to
deceive, constitutes inequitable conduct"); Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[1lnequitable conduct also requires an intent to deceive.").
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need not always be proven by direct evidence 5 3-the proverbial "smoking gun."54
Instead, intent to deceive may be inferred by indirect evidence.55 Intent to deceive
generally is inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the patent
applicant's overall conduct.56
The prevailing Federal Circuit standard-relatively recently articulated in
three opinions-permits an inference of intent to deceive when (1) highly
material information is withheld, (2) the patent applicant knew of the information
and knew or should have known of the materiality of the information, and (3) the
patent applicant has not provided a credible explanation for withholding it.57 In
light of the "should have known" language, this standard arguably allows the fact
finder to infer intent to deceive when the patent applicant is negligent regarding
the materiality of withheld information and the evidence shows knowledge of the
information, high materiality of the information, and an absence of a credible
explanation for withholding the information. At least this threshold state of mind
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.58 In addition, any inference of
intent to deceive "must . . . be the single most reasonable inference able to be
drawn from the evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard."59
c. Lesser Degrees ofMateriality or Intent May Be Sufficient-Balancing
Materiality and State ofMind
The Federal Circuit has justified its holding that the reasonable examiner
standard of materiality may be used in analyzing an allegation of inequitable
conduct by indicating that, to the extent that one standard requires a higher
showing of materiality than another standard, the requisite finding of intent may
be lower.60 The implicit corollary is that, to the extent one standard requires a
lower showing of materiality than another standard, the requisite finding of intent
may be higher. This balancing of the equities is a hallmark of the current law
governing the inequitable conduct defense.
53. Impax Labs., 468 F.3d at 1375 ("'Intent need not, and rarely can, be proven by direct evidence."'
(quoting Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989))).
54. See Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("'Smoking gun evidence
is not required in order to establish an intent to deceive.... Rather, this element of inequitable conduct[]
must generally be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the applicant's overall
conduct"' (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs. Inc.,
984 F.2d 1182, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1993))).
55. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366.
56. See id. (stating that deceptive intent may be inferred from indirect or circumstantial evidence).
57. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1191 (Fed.
Cir. 2006). Notably, judge Dyk authored each of these three opinions. Whether these cases articulate the
correct standard for determining when it is, and is not, appropriate to infer intent to deceive has become
a hotly disputed issue at the Federal Circuit See infra Part Ill.C for a discussion of recent opinions
critiquing the current law.
58. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365.
59. Id. at 1366.
60. Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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The Federal Circuit first addressed the balancing of evidence of materiality
and state of mind in inequitable conduct cases in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v.
Sowa & Sons, Inc.61 There, the court, in an opinion by Judge Rich,62 analyzed the
competing materiality standards and concluded-much like it would later in
Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Machine Works63-that it did not need to be bound
by any single standard because "'[q]uestions of materiality and culpability are
often interrelated and intertwined.' 64 Significantly, the court indicated that
evidence sufficient to meet the "objective but for" standard of materiality could be
combined with evidence of something less than gross negligence to reach the
conclusion of inequitable conduct.6s The court also indicated that evidence
sufficient to meet the "but it may have" standard-which it identified as
"strikingly similar" to the "reasonable examiner" standard 66-would need to be
combined with evidence of "something more than gross negligence or
recklessness."67
Numerous more recent cases lay out the current "equitable balancing" test
employed by the Federal Circuit. But unlike American Hoist & Derrick Co., these
cases do not express the equitable balancing test in concrete terms, with
specifically permissible combinations of materiality and state of mind. For
example, in Digital Control, the Federal Circuit recently explained that
where a reasonable examiner would merely have considered particular
information to be important but not crucial to his decision the requisite
finding of intent must be high. Conversely, where an objective "but for"
standard of materiality is shown, a lesser showing of facts from which
intent can be inferred may be sufficient.68
61. 725 F.2d 1350, 1362-64 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
62. judge Rich was one of the authors of the 1952 Patent Act and, at the time of his death in 1999,
was the oldest active federal judge in the history of the United States. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Giles S. Rich,
Oldest Active Federaljudge, Dies at 95, N.Y. TiMEs, June 12, 1999, at A13. Judge Rich's opinion in Critikon,
Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997), recently has come
under attack for relying upon precedent from Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
which was overruled in Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (relevant portion en banc). See Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317,
1344 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J., concurring) (noting that Critikon relied on the simple negligence
standard laid out in Driscoll); Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (identifying Critikon as bad law in part because of its reliance of Driscoll). Yet, in
Critikon, Judge Rich did not rely on any legal concept overruled in Kingsdown. In particular, he did not
rely on gross negligence alone to find inequitable conduct. Critikon, Inc., 120 F.3d at 1259. Instead, he
found inequitable conduct by combining evidence of gross negligence together with evidence of
materiality and the absence of any good faith explanation. Id. ("Given the materiality and the failure at
any point to offer a good faith explanation of the pattern of non-disclosure, an intent to mislead may be
inferred.").
63. 437 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
64. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1363 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d
701, 716 (1st Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at 1363.
66. Id. at 1362.
67. Id. at 1363.
68. Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315-16 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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While the court explains that the "reasonable examiner" materiality standard
must be combined with a "high" finding of "intent,"69 it does not identify the
particular state of mind required to be shown. Similarly, while the court explains
that the "objective but for" standard of materiality may be combined with "a lesser
showing of facts from which intent can be inferred,"70 it does not identify the
particular threshold state of mind required to be shown.7'
2. Remedies for Inequitable Conduct
Remedies for inequitable conduct "include unenforceability of the affected
patent or patents and possible attorney fees." 72 As for the first remedy,
unenforceability, "[w]hen a court . . . determine[s] that inequitable conduct
occurred in relation to one or more claims73 during prosecution of the patent
application, the entire patent is rendered unenforceable."74 Inequitable conduct,
however, also may render related patents unenforceable under what has been
called the "doctrine of infectious unenforceability."75
As for the second remedy, an award of attorney fees, the basis for awarding
this remedy is statutory. In particular, 35 U.S.C. § 285 recites that "[tjhe court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party."
"Exceptional cases are normally those involving bad faith litigation or those
involving inequitable conduct by the patentee in procuring a patent." 6
69. In context, it is clear that the use of the word "intent" in this portion of Digital Control is not
limited to direct evidence of intent, but captures lesser states of mind that allow deceptive intent to be
inferred. Similarly, use of the term "intent" in this Article, based on context, may refer to direct evidence
of deceptive intent or to lesser states of mind whereby intent to deceive may be inferred.
70. Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1316.
71. As will be shown, this penchant for vague terminology-though understandable in light of an
equitable doctrine that favors flexibility-has led to a dispute over the state of mind threshold required
to prove inequitable conduct under current law. The current inequitable conduct law requires at least a
showing of knowledge of an omission or misrepresentation and knowledge of its materiality when the
evidence only meets the "reasonable examiner" standard of materiality. Conversely, when only gross
negligence (or perhaps negligence) can be demonstrated, the current law likely requires that the
omission or misrepresentation reach at least the "objective but for" standard of materiality. See infra
notes 111-35 and accompanying text for an analysis of the dispute over the state of mind threshold
required to prove inequitable conduct under the current law. Even if the law of inequitable conduct is
not reformed, the appropriate combinations of materiality and state of mind should be identified
specifically for the benefit of the patent bar and the courts.
72. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing 35
U.S.C. §§ 282, 285 (1994)).
73. Patent "claims" are the numbered paragraphs at the end of patents that "particularly point[]
out and distinctly claim[| the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. §
112, para. 2 (2006).
74. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867,877 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (relevant
portion en banc) (emphases added) (footnote added). In other words, inequitable conduct renders all
claims of the patent unenforceable.
75. Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1227, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming a district
court's application of the "doctrine of infectious unenforceability" because "inequitable conduct with
respect to one or more patents in a family can infect related applications").
76. Brasseler, U.S.A. 1. L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing
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III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT LAW GOVERNING THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DEFENSE
There are significant problems associated with the current law governing the
inequitable conduct defense. And, while the law of inequitable conduct has long
been a target of criticism, several recent opinions in Federal Circuit cases have
brought the criticism to a crescendo. Traditional and more recent critiques of the
inequitable conduct defense will be analyzed before this Article turns to a
presentation and analysis of potential reforms of the defense, including
transforming it into a tool to detect and prevent "patent fraud."
A. The "Plague" ofAllegations
The Federal Circuit has been grappling with inequitable conduct law almost
since its inception. In an early opinion, the Federal Circuit lamented that "the habit
of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an
absolute plague."77 This metaphor-invoking, perhaps, thoughts of swarms of flies
or locusts7 8-has become a recurring critique of inequitable conduct law.79
The idea behind the metaphor is that allegations of inequitable conduct are
too commonplace and, as a result, on balance the doctrine is more harmful than
productive. The specter of the inequitable conduct defense, of course, encourages
patent applicants to take steps to correct the information asymmetry inherent in
their interaction with the Patent Office, which one might assume would benefit the
public. And, as discussed earlier, the information asymmetry can be significant
where examiners lack the necessary information regarding cutting-edge
technology and prior art to make informed decisions about the patentability of
inventions. But, from the opposite perspective, the gold at the end of the
rainbow-unenforceability of patents and attorney fees-attracts prospectors,
and each allegation of inequitable conduct has significant ramifications and costs.
By invoking the "plague" critique, judges seemingly voice their opinion that the
costs borne by the public outweigh the benefits to the public.
Costs associated with overenforcement of the inequitable conduct defense
are significant. If patent applicants overdisclose prior art to the Patent Office,80 for
Cambridge Prods., Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients Inc., 962 F.2d 1048,1050-51 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
77. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
78. See Exodus 8:20-24, 10:3-15 (describing plague of flies and locusts divinely imposed upon
Egypt to convince Pharaoh to free Israelite slaves).
79. See, e.g., Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (Linn, J., concurring) (characterizing inequitable conduct allegations as "plague" on judicial
system); Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J.,
dissenting) (same); McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897,926 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (same); Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1196-1203 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (Newman, J., dissenting) (same).
80. Overdisclosure of prior art (and other information) more often occurs during reexamination
proceedings than during the original examination of patent applications. Reexamination proceedings
often occur after the beginning of licensing negotiations or patent infringement litigation, where the
patentee receives or develops voluminous information regarding prior art and other disputed issues like
how the claims of the patent should be construed. Patentees often disclose all of this information to the
Patent Office during reexamination proceedings.
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example, highly material prior art may end up being a needle in a haystack filled
with immaterial prior art.81 Examiners may spend unnecessary time filtering
through immaterial prior art that they otherwise would not waste time reviewing.
Or worse, examiners may not find and review the highly material prior art and
allow invalid patents to issue.82 In that case, "[tjhe far-reaching social and
economic consequences of a patent" 3 would be unleashed while the public's
"paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies ... are kept within their
legitimate scope"8 4-one of the very goals of the inequitable conduct defense-
might be thwarted. These far-reaching social and economic consequences include
the prevention of competition in the marketplace, the potential for patentees to be
unable to meet consumer demand for new technology, the potential tax on
consumers in the form of monopoly profits, transactional costs associated with
licensing patented technology from patentees, and litigation costs related to
enforcement actions. And while the validity of a patent can be questioned in
subsequent patent infringement litigation, the presumption of validity8s and the
clear and convincing burden to prove invalidity86 raise significant hurdles once a
patent issues.
81. On the other hand, in a touch of irony, when a patent applicant effectively hides highly material
prior art in a "haystack" of immaterial prior art, the "candor of th[e] act [of disclosure] ... is severely
diminished by the manner of th[e] disclosure," Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1188 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Nies, J., dissenting in part), and a finding of inequitable conduct may result. See Sean M.
O'Connor, Defusing the "Atomic Bomb" of Patent Litigation: Avoiding and Defending Against Allegations of
Inequitable Conduct After McKesson et al., 9 J. MARSHALL REv. INTELL. PROP. L. 330, 330 (2009) ("[T]he fact
or appearance of 'burying' material documents within a ream of less relevant references remains a solid
ground for a finding of inequitable conduct.").
82. Ultimately, overcompliance with the duty of disclosure degrades the quality of issued patents.
See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 723, 728 (2009) (concluding that "the inequitable conduct doctrine has the ability to improve patent
quality as long as the inherent tendency to overcomply with the doctrine by overloading the [Patent
Office] with information is kept in check").
83. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945).
84. Id.
85. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (setting forth law that patents are presumed to be valid and
providing defenses in actions claiming validity or infringement of patents).
86. See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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In light of the "plague" of inequitable conduct allegations,87 it is important to
recognize that there are two primary factors driving the number of inequitable
conduct allegations: (1) the standard for proving inequitable conduct and (2) the
reward for proving inequitable conduct. If the standard for proving inequitable
conduct is too low, then-all else being equal-the number of allegations of
inequitable conduct will be too high. Likewise, if the reward for proving
inequitable conduct is too high, then-all else being equal-the number of
allegations of inequitable conduct will be too high. The plague of inequitable
conduct allegations may be the result of a combination of these two facts: too low
a hurdle to prove inequitable conduct and too great a reward for proving
inequitable conduct. Thus, two options are, first, to make the standard for proving
inequitable conduct more difficult to meet and, second, to reduce the benefit
provided for proving inequitable conduct. These options will be explored below.
B. The Tolls ofAllegations
Apart from the costs associated with overdisclosure of information to the
Patent Office, each individual allegation of inequitable conduct incurs substantial
costs. Of course, litigants have to spend time and effort to assert and defend these
allegations, and courts have to spend time and effort to resolve them. While these
costs only marginally increase the cost of patent infringement litigation, the high
cost of patent litigation, with respect to litigants at least, is well documented.88
The cost to courts is not well documented. But courts, too, bear significant
transactional costs. Courts must analyze pleadings involving allegations of
inequitable conduct for compliance with the heightened pleading requirement of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), analyze discovery and summary judgment
motions related to the defense, and conduct jury and/or separate bench trials on
the defense.89
87. The "plague" critique in judicial opinions appears to be based on anecdotal evidence rather
than on hard data, since these opinions rarely, if ever, cite any authority regarding the number of
inequitable conduct allegations in patent infringement cases. See supra note 79 for recent judicial
opinions that have used the plague critique. Available statistics, however, show that the number of
appellate and trial court judgments on the issue of inequitable conduct rose by over 100% between
2005 and 2009, although at least part of this increase likely reflects the increase in patent litigation over
the same time period. See U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, PATSTATS.ORG,
http://www.patstats.org/Patstats2.html (follow respective hyperlinks for "2005" "2006" "2007" "2008"
"2009") (last visitied Oct 10, 2010) (indicating forty-six inequitable conduct judgments in 2005, sixty-
six judgments in 2006, ninety-one judgments in 2007, and ninety-three judgments in 2008). On the
other hand, inequitable conduct judgments in 2009 were down significantly from 2008. Id. (indicating
thirty-eight judgments in 2009). Furthermore, these statistics cannot be used to identify the percentage
of all patent cases involving allegations of inequitable conduct because they do not identify the number
of cases that settle.
88. In 2009, the median total cost of a patent infringement lawsuit with between $1 million and
$25 million at risk was $2.5 million. LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT
OF THE EcONOMIC SURVEY 2009,29 (2009).
89. The en banc Federal Circuit has held that "the ultimate question of whether inequitable
conduct occurred is equitable in nature" and "committed to the discretion of the trial court." Kingsdown
Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (relevant portion en banc).
The court has also held that it is appropriate for a trial court to hold a bench trial on the issue of
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Another effect of an allegation of inequitable conduct in a patent
infringement lawsuit is to prevent patent attorneys accused of the inequitable
conduct from representing the patentee in the lawsuit. This occurs because of
ethical rules that effectively prohibit an attorney from advocating on behalf of a
party at a trial in which the attorney will be a witness.9 0 A problem with this
result, at least from the perspective of the patentee, and perhaps too from the
perspective of courts and juries, is that the attorney with the most knowledge of
the technology at issue often is the attorney that prosecuted the patent.
Allegations of inequitable conduct also may affect juries' and courts' views of
the merits of other issues in patent infringement lawsuits, primarily infringement
and validity.9' And inequitable conduct allegations-perhaps even baseless
ones-have a negative impact on the reputations of inventors and patent
attorneys accused of wrongdoing. 92 These allegations might also degrade the
public's view of the patent system, which in turn may encourage infringement of
patents.
C. Recent Opinions Criticizing the Current Law Governing the Defense
Recently, particular judges at the Federal Circuit have shown an interest in
revisiting fundamental aspects of the defense of inequitable conduct These
judges' opinions include scathing criticisms of the application of the current law
governing the inequitable conduct defense. The opinions highlight some of the
problematic tolls of allegations of inequitable conduct, indicate that the time for
reform of the inequitable conduct defense is at hand, and point toward the
direction that the reform may be headed.
1. McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc.
In McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc.,93 the Federal
Circuit affirmed a district court's finding of inequitable conduct based on the
nondisclosure of three pieces of information, where the undisclosed information
related to co-pending patent applications.9 4 judge Newman dissented, highlighting
inequitable conduct. Agfa Corp. v. Creo Prods. Inc., 451 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Nevertheless,
the inequitable conduct defense may be tried to a jury for an advisory ruling. See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc. v.
Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that jury returned unanimous advisory
verdict concerning equitable issues in case at hand). Either approach involves costs. A bench trial, of
course, requires the court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law-a particularly laborious task.
90. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.7(a) (2009) (stating that a lawyer shall not act as
an advocate in case where lawyer will likely testify unless specifically enumerated exceptions are met).
91. This particular negative externality may be addressed by bifurcating issues of inequitable
conduct from other issues in a lawsuit See Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1211-
13 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (concluding that district court did not abuse discretion in trying an inequitable
conduct claim prior to-other claims in patent infringement lawsuit).
92. See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(Rader, J., dissenting) (discussing reputational risks a scientist takes when deceiving Patent Office about
research supporting patent).
93. 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
94. McKesson Info. Solutions, 487 F.3d at 901-02.
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her belief that the facts did not rise to the level necessary to prove deceptive
intent.9 5 In particular, she stressed that it is not clear and convincing evidence of
deceptive intent that a patent applicant did not inform a patent examiner about
information the applicant knew the examiner had access to and actually
considered during examination of co-pending patent applications.9 6 In Judge
Newman's view, the majority's holding "returns to the 'plague' of encouraging
unwarranted charges of inequitable conduct, spawning the opportunistic litigation
that here succeeded despite consistently contrary precedent"97
2. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,98 the Federal
Circuit affirmed a district court's finding of inequitable conduct based on the
failure to disclose information used to evaluate a comparison of the invention with
prior art, where that comparison was emphasized during prosecution." Judge
Rader dissented, expressing his view that the law should "restrict[] a finding of
inequitable conduct to only the most extreme cases of fraud and deception"100 and
bemoaning recent cases as "too often emphasiz[ing] materiality almost to the
exclusion of any analysis of the lofty intent requirement for inequitable
conduct."10 ' Judge Rader also highlighted some of the problematic incentives to
allege inequitable conduct. He pointed out that an allegation of inequitable
conduct
opens new avenues of discovery; impugns the integrity of [the]
patentee, its counsel, and the patent itself; excludes the prosecuting
attorney from [representing the patentee during trial]; and even offers
the trial court a way to dispose of a case without the rigors of claim
construction and other complex patent doctrines.102
95. Id. at 926-27 (Newman, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 926. Judge Newman's analysis summarized the relevant facts as she saw them:
It is not clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent that the applicant did not inform the
examiner of the examiner's grant of a related case of common parentage a few months earlier,
a case that was examined by the same examiner and whose existence has previously been
explicitly pointed out by the same applicant. Nor is it clear and convincing evidence of
deceptive intent that the applicant did not cite a reference that the applicant had cited in the
same related case, and that had been explicitly discussed with the same examiner in the
related case.
Id.
97. Id. at 926-27; see also Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1195-1205 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (Newman, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's inference of deceptive intent and stating
that majority's approach will have adverse impact on industrial innovation).
98. 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
99. Aventis Pharma S.A., 525 F.3d at 1337. In particular, the patent applicant failed to disclose the
dosage of a prior art composition used in half-life comparisons with the patented composition. Id. at
1346.
100. Id. at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting).
101. Id.at1350.
102. Id. at 1349-50.
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3. Larson Manufacturing Co. ofSouth Dakota v. Aluminart Products Ltd.
In Larson Manufacturing Co. ofSouth Dakota v. Aluminart Products Ltd.,103 the
Federal Circuit vacated a district court's finding of inequitable conduct, holding
that the district court erred in concluding that three undisclosed items were
material.104 Because the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that two
other undisclosed items were material, the Federal Circuit remanded the case for
the district court to redetermine the issue of intent and then, if it found intent, to
rebalance materiality and intent to arrive at an ultimate conclusion on the issue of
inequitable conduct.105
Judge Linn filed a concurring opinion.106 He expressed his view that the
Federal Circuit's precedent has significantly diverged from the Supreme Court's
treatment of inequitable conduct and perpetuates the plague of inequitable
conduct allegations in almost every major patent case. 0 7 As Judge Linn noted,
"[t]he Supreme Court's three inequitable conduct cases involved overt fraud, not
equivocal acts of omission." 08
Judge Linn lamented that the Federal Circuit's case law is in "seeming
contradiction"' 9 with its en banc decision in Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd.
v. Hollister Inc.110 In Kingsdown, the en banc Federal Circuit clarified that
materiality and intent both must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and
that "'gross negligence does not of itself justify an inference of intent to
deceive.""" In Judge Linn's view, "a standard even lower than 'gross negligence'
has propagated" through Federal Circuit case law addressing the inequitable
conduct defense.112
In particular, Judge Linn criticized the Federal Circuit's case law that permits
an inference of intent to deceive when "'(1) highly material information is
withheld; (2) the applicant knew of the information [and] ... knew or should have
known of the materiality of the information; and (3) the applicant has not
provided a credible explanation for the withholding."' "3 In Judge Linn's view, the
first prong simply repeats the materiality element, the second prong sets forth a
simple negligence standard, and the third prong effectively shifts the burden to
the patentee to prove a negative when the accused infringer has not even carried
its burden to prove a threshold degree of intent by clear and convincing
103. 559 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
104. Larson Mfg. Co., 559 F.3d at 1320.
105. Id. at 1320-21.
106. Id. at 1342 (Linn, J., concurring).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1343.
109. Id.
110. 863 F.2d 867,876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (relevant portion en banc).
111. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867,876 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
112. Larson Mfg. Co., 559 F.3d at 1343 (Linn, J., concurring).
113. Id. (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306,
1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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evidence.114 Judge Linn observed that this three-pronged standard for inferring
deceptive intent "is in tension with the rule . . . that the inference must ... be the
single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence."115
Judge Linn concluded that
the test for inferring deceptive intent, as it currently exists, falls short of
the standard "need[ed] to strictly enforce the burden of proof and
elevated standard of proof in the inequitable conduct context." The facts
of this case suggest that the time has come for the court to review the
issue en banc.116
Thus, Judge Linn expressly called for the Federal Circuit, en banc, to review
the current law governing the inequitable conduct defense and, in particular,
modify the test for inferring deceptive intent
As a preliminary matter, while Judge Linn suggested that Kingsdown
eliminated the ability to rely on "gross negligence" to infer intent and ultimately
prove inequitable conduct,117 a close reading of Kingsdown reveals that it did not
114. Id. at 1343-44. Technically, this first critique is not accurate. The first prong emphasizes one
of the more stringent standards for proving materiality, not the threshold "reasonable examiner"
materiality standard. Thus, the first prong does not "simply repeat[] the materiality element." Id.
115. Id. at 1344 (internal quotation marks omitted). For the rule that the "inference must... be the
single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence," Judge Linn relies upon Star
Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008), which in turn relies upon
Scanner Technologies Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp., 528 F.3d 1365, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2008), which in
turn relies upon Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
1998), which in turn relies upon Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1997), which in turn relies upon Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d
867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (relevant portion en banc). As the Federal Circuit explained in Scanner, the
Akron court "found clear error because the district court failed to give due weight to evidence of good
faith that would call for inferences contrary to a finding of deceit." Scanner Techs. Corp., 528 F.3d at
1375. Akron itself recites that "[wihen examining intent to deceive, a court must weigh all the evidence,
including evidence of good faith." Akron, 148 F.3d at 1384. For this proposition, Akron cites Gambro
Lundia AB, 110 F.3d at 1580, which recites that "[t]he court weighs the intent of the party in light of all
evidence, including evidence of good faith." And Kingsdown holds that "all the evidence, including
evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to
deceive." Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876. In other words, all of the evidence (including evidence of gross
negligence and good faith) must be considered before determining whether it is appropriate to infer
deceptive intent. Star Scientific, however, applies a dose of common sense to the consideration of all the
evidence. If evidence of good faith allows for an inference contrary to a finding of deceit, and that
inference is more reasonable than an inference of deceit, then a priori there is no basis to infer deceptive
intent. See Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366. Notably, Star Scientific is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent regarding the requirement to prove a "strong inference" of intent to deceive for purposes of
establishing securities fraud under Federal law. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 314 (2007) (holding that, in the pleading context, "an inference of scienter must be more than
merely plausible or reasonable-it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference
of nonfraudulent intent").
116. Larson Mfg. Co., 559 F.3d at 1344 (Linn, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Star
Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365).
117. In a more recent case, Judge Linn expressly claims that Kingsdown eliminated a "gross
negligence" standard for inequitable conduct. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289,
1319 (Fed. Cir.) (Linn, J., dissenting) ("The requisite level of intent is 'specific intent'-not simple
negligence, or even gross negligence." (citing Star Scientific Inc., 537 F.3d at 1368)), vacated, 374 Fed.
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do so. Kingsdown emphasized that gross negligence in and of itself is not sufficient
to prove inequitable conduct.118 Instead, Kingsdown requires the trier of fact to
consider all the evidence, including evidence of gross negligence but also good
faith, in determining whether there is intent to deceive.119 In this regard, it is
important to recognize the holdings of the two cases overruled in Kingsdown:
Driscoll v. CebalO120 and In rejerabek.121 In Driscoll, the Federal Circuit reversed a
holding of no inequitable conduct because the Federal Circuit (1) found
materiality using the reasonable examiner standard and (2) inferred intent to
deceive based upon a gross negligence standard.122 In Jerabek, the Federal Circuit
similarly affirmed a holding of inequitable conduct based on (1) a finding of
materiality using the reasonable examiner standard and (2) a finding of intent to
deceive based upon a gross negligence standard.123 Significantly, in neither Driscoll
norJerabek did the Federal Circuit analyze the state of mind requirement in view
of the finding of materiality under the reasonable examiner standard, nor did it
balance the evidence of materiality and intent before reaching a conclusion
regarding inequitable conduct. Instead, as recited in Jerabek, these cases merely
held that "[a] permissible finding of gross negligence is sufficient and can be
shown where [the applicant's] attorney knew or should have known that the
withheld reference would be material to the [Patent Office]'s consideration."124
Contrast these cases overruled in Kingsdown with the case that Kingsdown
implicitly endorsed, FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co.' 2 In FMC, the Federal Circuit
explained how the investigations into materiality and state of mind include
overlapping considerations that must be balanced before reaching a conclusion on
the issue of inequitable conduct.126 After recognizing that the level of materiality
of information may be high or low, the court held that the patent applicant must
be chargeable with both knowledge of the information and knowledge of its
materiality.127 Significantly, the court also held that "an applicant who knew of
[prior] art or information cannot intentionally avoid learning of its materiality
through gross negligence, i.e., it may be found that the applicant 'should have
Appx. 35, 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (granting en banc rehearing).
118. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
119. Id. Not all commentators interpret Kingsdown in this way. Some interpret Kingsdown as
rejecting the ability to rely on gross negligence at all. E.g., Erik R. Puknys & Jared D. Schuettenhelm,
Application of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine After Kingsdown, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 839, 849 (2009).
120. 731 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1984), overruled by Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
121. 789 F.2d 886 (Fed. Cir. 1986), overruled by Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
122. Driscoll, 731 F.2d at 884-85. In Driscoll, the Federal Circuit emphasized that to prove
inequitable conduct one need not prove reliance by the Patent Office on any violation of the duty of
disclosure. Id. This aspect of Driscoll is consistent with cases after Kingsdown. See, e.g., Agfa Corp. v. Creo
Prods. Inc., 451 F.3d 1366, 1375 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasizing that reliance is not an element of
inequitable conduct defense).
123. In referabek, 789 F.2d at 890-92.
124. Id. at 891.
125. 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987).




known' of that materiality."128 Thus, the court indicated that gross negligence (or
even negligence in light of the "should have known" language) regarding
materiality may support a finding of inequitable conduct in some situations.
In FMC, however, the court went on to explain that gross negligence
regarding materiality alone does not require a finding of intent to mislead,
because evidence of subjective good faith may offset evidence of gross
negligence.129 Stated conversely, FMC indicates that knowledge of withheld prior
art, coupled with gross negligence regarding its materiality, may be combined
with an absence of evidence of subjective good faith to infer intent to mislead. The
FMC opinion also recognizes that an inference of intent may be easier to prove
when materiality is high and there is "clear proof that [the patent applicant] knew
or should have known of that materiality."130 Thus, in FMC, the Federal Circuit
indicated that gross negligence (or even negligence given the "should have
known" language) may be used to infer intent to mislead if the applicant knew of
withheld information and knew or should have known that the withheld
information was highly material.
Several opinions issued by the Federal Circuit shortly after Kingsdown are
consistent with FMC. They indicate that gross negligence with regard to the
materiality of prior art may be used to infer intent to mislead depending upon the
totality of the circumstances.131 More recent cases also have interpreted
Kingsdown as holding that gross negligence may be combined with other factors to
infer intent to deceive.132 Yet not all Federal Circuit opinions appear to interpret
Kingsdown in this manner-particularly recent opinions.' 33
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 1415 n.9 (citing J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
130. Id. at 1416.
131. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("This court has clarified that negligent conduct can support an inference of intent only when,'viewed in
light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith,' the conduct is culpable enough 'to
require a finding of intent to deceive.'.. .. Gross negligence cannot elevate itself by its figurative boot-
straps to an intent to mislead based on the identical factors used to establish gross negligence in the first
instance unless all the facts and circumstances indicate sufficient culpability." (emphases added) (quoting
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (relevant portion
en banc))); Wirco, Inc. v. Rolock, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1084, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("The intent element of
inequitable conduct cannot always be inferred from a pattern of conduct that amounts to gross
negligence, but [applicant's] conduct here, 'viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence
indicative of good faith, . . . indicate[s] sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive."'
(second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876)); Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. v. Lemmon Co., 906 F.2d 684, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[T]he district judge was incorrect with
respect to both holdings of inequitable conduct when he found gross negligence and then inferred the
intent to deceive based on that finding alone. Instead, he must examine the gross negligence in light ofall
surrounding circumstances (e.g., good faith) to see if [the applicant's] conduct rises to the level of an
intent to deceive." (emphasis added)); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1562
(Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[G]rossly negligent conduct may or may not compel an inference of an intent to
mislead. Such an inference depends upon the totality of the circumstances...." (emphasis added)).
132. See, e.g., M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., 439 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2006) ("Even if there were evidence of gross negligence in nondisclosure, which was not found, that
would not necessarily constitute inequitable conduct." (emphasis added)); CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l
Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[Elven gross negligence does not alone suffice to establish
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Thus, while Judge Linn seemed to argue that current law diverges from the
holding of Kingsdown, the current law taken as a whole appears to reflect the
holding of Kingsdown, FMC, pre-Kingsdown cases addressing the balancing of
equities in inequitable conduct cases, 134 and cases decided shortly after
Kingsdown. Those cases hold that gross negligence (or even negligence given the
"should have known" language) may be used to prove inequitable conduct when
combined with other evidence, such as highly material omissions or
misrepresentations and the absence of evidence of good faith.
Judge Linn, however, has highlighted that the current state of the law is
inconsistent with the purpose of the holding of Kingsdown-to eliminate the
plague of inequitable conduct allegations. In other words, in his view the law has
not gone far enough to prevent the improper use and resulting costs of the
inequitable conduct defense. And in his view, the root of that problem is the ability
to infer intent to deceive based on evidence that includes negligence or gross
negligence.
In light of these recent opinions, judges at the Federal Circuit appear ready to
reconsider the current law governing the inequitable conduct defense and adopt a
higher standard to prove inequitable conduct. To do so, these judges might
borrow from other legal doctrines, such as those addressing fraud. In this regard,
it is important to note Judge Linn's subsequent opinion for the Federal Circuit in
Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,'s 5 because there Judge Linn did import
concepts from the law of fraud into the law of inequitable conduct
4. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
In Exergen, the Federal Circuit clarified the pleading standard applicable to
claims of inequitable conduct.'3 6 Addressing an appeal from a denial of a motion
to add inequitable conduct as an affirmative defense, the Federal Circuit held that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires "identification of the specific who,
intent" (emphasis added)).
133. See, e.g., Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 776 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
("Appellants state that they have shown a 'high degree of materiality,' and that they therefore need a
proportionally lesser showing of intent to deceive to establish the requisite threshold level of intent
That is incorrect Evidence of mistake or negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to support
inequitable conduct in patent prosecution."); Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2008) ("Mistake or negligence, even gross negligence, does not support a ruling of inequitable
conduct."); see also In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("The principle that the
standard for finding intent to deceive is stricter than the standard for negligence or gross negligence,
even though announced in patent inequitable conduct cases, applies with equal force to trademark fraud
cases."). Notably, Astrazeneca and Abbott were written by judge Newman, who dissented in McKesson
Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
134. See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(discussing necessity of balancing evidence of intent and materiality). Notably, Kingsdown did not
purport to overrule American Hoist and Derrick Co.
135. 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
136. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1326-29.
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what, when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission" when
pleading inequitable conduct in patent cases.137
In reaching its holding, the Federal Circuit borrowed liberally from the law of
fraud.138 The court relied primarily upon Rule 9(b), which by its terms addresses
fraud or mistake.' 39 The Federal Circuit also cited cases in the First and Seventh
Circuits addressing fraud.140 Exergen may represent the first foray into the
adoption of principles from the law of fraud into the law of inequitable conduct.
More of these principles can and should be adopted.
IV. REFORMING THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DEFENSE
In light of the traditional displeasure with the plague of inequitable conduct
assertions and the recent focus on tightening the doctrine-particularly regarding
the ability to infer intent to deceive-it is time for a new paradigm: "patent fraud."
In the alternative, the state of mind threshold to infer intent to deceive for
inequitable conduct should be increased to at least recklessness.
A. A New Paradigm: "Patent Fraud"
A new paradigm should be adopted for the inequitable conduct defense that
focuses on the prevention of fraud in the procurement of patents. The paradigm-
which I term the "patent fraud" paradigm-should concern only highly material
and knowing or intentional omissions and misrepresentations made to the Patent
Office. Lesser forms of misconduct should be addressed by other legal doctrines.
Such a change to the inequitable conduct defense-with its current remedies of
unenforceability and possible attorney fees-would help to (1) increase the
effectiveness of the duties of candor, good faith, and disclosure to the Patent Office
by eliminating overdisclosure of information; (2) eliminate the plague of
inequitable conduct allegations; and (3) reduce the negative tolls associated with
allegations of inequitable conduct.
A "patent fraud" paradigm would adopt concepts from the law of fraud, in
particular the materiality and state of mind thresholds utilized in the antitrust
claim addressed by the Supreme Court in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food
Machinery & Chemical Corp.141 This new paradigm would require clear and
137. Id. at 1327.
138. One justification for the application of Rule 9(b) to allegations of inequitable conduct is the
unfair reputational harm of unfounded allegations of inequitable conduct, discussed above. See supra
note 92 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the impact inequitable conduct allegations can
have on inventor and patent attorney reputations. Notably, this justification borrows from case law
addressing fraud. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1329 n.6 ("[O]ne of the purposes of Rule 9(b) is 'to protect those
whose reputation would be harmed as a result of being subject to fraud charges."' (quoting Kearns v.
Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009)).
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.").
140. Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1326, 1327 (citing Alternative Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374
F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2004); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624,627 (7th Cir. 1990)).
141. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
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convincing evidence of (a) knowledge or intent regarding (b) a highly material
misrepresentation or omission meeting the "objective but for" or "subjective but
for" materiality standards. These concepts will be introduced by analyzing the
Walker Process case itself.
In Walker Process, the Supreme Court provided guidance as to what
constitutes fraudulent procurement of a patent There, the patentee, Food
Machinery and Chemical Corporation ("Food Machinery"), sued Walker Process
Equipment ("Walker Process") for infringement based on a patent concerning
technology used in sewage treatment plants.142 In response, Walker Process
counterclaimed, alleging that Food Machinery fraudulently and in bad faith
obtained its patent so as to create a monopoly that violated antitrust law.143 The
basis for Walker Process's antitrust counterclaim stemmed from Food
Machinery's alleged public use of the invention more than a year prior to filing its
patent application and its express, sworn representation to the Patent Office to the
contrary.144 In other words, the antitrust counterclaim was based on alleged fraud
on the Patent Office.
The Supreme Court noted that it was dealing "with a special class of patents,
i.e., those procured by intentional fraud."145 The Court opined that, to prevail,
Walker Process would need to prove that Food Machinery obtained its patent by
"knowingly and willfully misrepresenting [the] facts to the Patent Office."146 Proof
of good faith by Food Machinery, the Court continued, would furnish a complete
defense.147 Such good faith would include an honest mistake.' 48
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan shed light on the requirements for
showing intentional fraud. Like the majority, he emphasized that a plaintiff would
need to prove that the relevant patent was "procured by knowing and willfulfraud
practiced by the defendant on the Patent Office."149 He also pointed out that a
142. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 173.
143. Id. at 174.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 177 (emphasis added). The Court also indicated that permitting a private party to
recover treble damages for the fraudulent procurement of a patent-when that conduct was coupled
with proof of the other requirements of section 2 of the Sherman Act-would promote the purpose of
"'seeing that patent monopolies ... are kept within their legitimate scope.'" Id. at 176-77 (quoting
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)). The Court held that,
to prove an antitrust violation, Walker Process would still need to prove the remaining elements of
section 2 of the Sherman Act, including exclusionary power in terms of the relevant market for the
relevant product. Id. at 177-78. The fact that Walker Process involved an alleged antitrust violation,
which requires additional proof over and above a finding of fraud on the Patent Office, however, does
not affect the Court's analysis of the subsidiary issue of whether the patent applicant committed fraud
on the Patent Office.
147. Id. at 177.
148. Id. The Court indicated that an honest mistake would constitute "technical fraud," a phrase it
used to refer to the absence of intentional fraud. Id
149. Id. at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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plaintiff would not be able to prove fraud if it showed no more than invalidity of
the patent due, for example, to obviousness. 50
1. Evidentiary Standard for Proving Walker Process Fraud
The Supreme Court's and Justice Harlan's focus on allegations of "knowingly
and willfully misrepresenting facts" and "intentional fraud"-and their contrasting
these allegations with "good faith," "honest mistake," and mere invalidity-indicate
that the state of mind required to prove fraudulent procurement of a patent is
high: knowing or intentional misconduct. Subsequent opinions by the lower
courts have emphasized the heightened evidentiary standard required to prove
what has become known as "Walker Process" fraud or a "Walker Process" antitrust
claim. For example, the Federal Circuit has bluntly stated that "an extremely high
level of misconduct.. . is necessary to sustain a Walker Process antitrust claim."' 5
The court has explained what this "extremely high level of misconduct" entails:
"independent and clear evidence of deceptive intent together with a clear showing
of reliance, i.e., that the patent would not have issued but for the
misrepresentation or omission."152 A helpful way to understand this evidentiary
standard-and how to incorporate it into the standard governing inequitable
conduct allegations-is to focus on the requirements of materiality and state of
mind.
2. Materiality Required to Prove Walker Process Fraud
A first concept embodied in the evidentiary standard governing allegations of
Walker Process fraud is materiality. While the Supreme Court in Walker Process
did not use the term "materiality," it focused on the same concept by assuming
that Food Machinery swore to the Patent Office that it did not know that its
invention had been in public use for more than one year prior to the filing date of
its patent application, and that the opposite was true.153 This is because, at the
time of Food Machinery's assumed conduct, an owner of an invention in public use
for more than one year prior to the filing of a patent application on the invention
was barred from obtaining a patent on the invention.154 In other words, Food
150. Id. To obtain a patent, an invention must be nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
151. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
152. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Nobelpharma is notable because it is the first Federal Circuit case extending the reach of Walker Process
to cases involving allegations of fraudulent omissions. See id. at 1070 ("[A] fraudulent omission can be
just as reprehensible as a fraudulent misrepresentation."). The Federal Circuit has expanded upon the
description of the evidentiary standard found in Nobelpharma:
Applied to patent prosecution, fraud requires (1) a false representation or deliberate omission
of a fact material to patentability, (2) made with the intent to deceive the patent examiner, (3)
on which the examiner justifiably relied in granting the patent, and (4) but for which
misrepresentation or deliberate omission the patent would not have been granted.
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
153. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174. Because of the procedural posture of the case, the Supreme
Court noted that it was required to consider Walker Process's allegations as true. Id. at 174-75.
154. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1965).
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Machinery never would have obtained its patent but for its (1) submission of false
information to the Patent Office and (2) withholding of true information from the
Patent Office. This materiality standard is the "objective but for" standard because
it does not depend on the subjective opinion of any particular patent examiner, let
alone the one that actually examined the patent at issue.155
In subsequent cases addressing allegations of Walker Process fraud, the
Federal Circuit has combined the "objective but for" standard with the concept of
reliance, resulting in a "subjective but for" standard that does depend on the
opinion of the particular patent examiner that handled the patent at issue. In the
words of the Federal Circuit, Walker Process fraud requires "a clear showing of
reliance, i.e., that the patent would not have issued but for the misrepresentation
or omission."'15 Thus, according to the Federal Circuit, fraud in the procurement
of a patent requires "a false representation or deliberate omission of a fact
material to patentability ... on which the examinerjustifiably relied in granting the
patent, and ... but for which misrepresentation or deliberate omission the patent
would not have been granted."157
Both the objective and subjective "but for" standards of materiality differ
substantially from the standards of materiality articulated by the Patent Office
with respect to the duty of due care and duty of disclosure. The "reasonable
examiner" materiality standard, for example, does not require evidence that the
patent would not have issued but for the omission or misrepresentation; it only
requires that the omission or misrepresentation would have been important to a
reasonable examiner. Similarly, the modern Rule 56 materiality standard does not
require evidence that the patent would not have issued but for the omission or
misrepresentation; it only requires that the omission or misrepresentation give
rise to a prima facie case of unpatentability or be inconsistent with an argument
made in favor of patentability. Thus, the objective and subjective "but for"
standards of materiality are much more difficult to meet than the "reasonable
examiner" materiality standard and the modern Rule 56 materiality standard.
Adopting the objective and subjective "but for" standards of materiality for
the inequitable conduct defense-and replacing the current "reasonable
examiner" standard-would focus the law of inequitable conduct on "patent
fraud" and, all else being equal, reduce both the number of allegations of
inequitable conduct and the problems associated with overenforcement of the
defense.
155. See Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(discussing differences between materiality standards).
156. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071 (emphasis added).
157. C.R Bard, 157 F.3d at 1364 (emphasis added). Applying this "subjective but for" standard of
materiality, the Federal Circuit affirmed a judgment of Walker Process fraud based on a finding that "a
reasonable jury could have found ... that the [prior art reference at issue] anticipated the patent and
that the examiner would not have granted the patent if he had been aware of the [prior art reference at
issuel." Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1072 (emphasis added). The finding that a reasonable jury could
conclude that a prior art reference "anticipated the patent" means that a reasonable jury could find the
patent invalid under one or more subsections of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). E.g., Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech.,
Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (considering section 102(a) in this context).
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3. State of Mind Required to Prove Walker Process Fraud
A second concept embodied in the evidentiary standard governing
allegations of Walker Process fraud is state of mind. As discussed, in Walker
Process the Supreme Court indicated that the state of mind required to prove
fraudulent procurement of a patent is knowledge or intent.'1 8 As explained by the
Federal Circuit, "'knowing and willful fraud' as the term is used in Walker [Process]
can mean no less than clear, convincing proof of intentional fraud involving
affirmative dishonesty, 'a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to
defraud . . . the Patent Office."'159 The Federal Circuit thus views Walker Process
fraud as an intentional, deliberate act of dishonesty to defraud the Patent Office.
Despite its view that Walker Process fraud must be intentional and deliberate,
the Federal Circuit has held that intent to mislead may be inferred. Notably,
however, any inference must be based on knowledge of information and
knowledge of that information's materiality. For example, intent to mislead may be
inferred when evidence shows that the patent applicant had knowledge of
withheld prior art and had knowledge of the prior art's materiality.160 The Federal
Circuit, for instance, has found that a jury could properly have inferred that an
inventor had the requisite intent to defraud the Patent Office based on his failure
to disclose a prior art book because that inventor-the author of the book in
question-"presumably knew of the book's relevance to the invention."161 Thus,
with respect to Walker Process fraud, at a minimum, knowledge of high materiality
must be proven.
The requirement to prove at least knowledge of high materiality is a
substantial difference between Walker Process fraud and the current law of
inequitable conduct. As discussed, the current law of inequitable conduct allows
intent to deceive to be inferred based in part on evidence of gross negligence (or
perhaps even negligence) regarding high materiality. 162 As with raising the
threshold for materiality, raising the state of mind threshold from gross
negligence (or negligence) to knowledge would focus the law of inequitable
conduct on "patent fraud" and, all else being equal, reduce both the number of
allegations of inequitable conduct and the problems associated with over-
enforcement of the defense.
158. See supra Part II.C.1.b for a general discussion of the state of mind necessary for a finding of
inequitable conduct.
159. CR Bard, 157 F.3d at 1364 (omission in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Handgards, Inc.
v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 996 (9th. Cir. 1979)). The Federal Circuit has concluded that the question
of "whether conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity
from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of Federal Circuit law." Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at
1068.
160. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1072.
161. Id. (emphasis added).




4. Lesser Showings of Materiality or Intent Are Not Sufficient-No
Balancing of Materiality and State of Mind
While the current law governing the inequitable conduct defense allows a
lesser degree of materiality (e.g., evidence meeting the "reasonable examiner"
materiality standard) to be combined with a higher degree of intent (e.g.,
knowledge) to prove inequitable conduct, and a lesser degree of intent (e.g., gross
negligence) to be combined with a higher degree of materiality (e.g., "objective but
for" materiality) to prove inequitable conduct, Walker Process fraud does not
permit lesser degrees of materiality or state of mind. That is, "a finding of Walker
Process fraud may not be based upon an equitable balancing of lesser degrees of
materiality and intent."163 Rather, Walker Process fraud must be based on
"independent" evidence of higher degrees of both materiality and intent.164
Eliminating the ability to find inequitable conduct when either evidence of
materiality or state of mind meets only a low standard would, again, focus the law
of inequitable conduct on "patent fraud" and, all else being equal, reduce the
number of allegations of inequitable conduct and problems associated with
overenforcement of the defense.
5. Benefits of Adopting the Walker Process Materiality and State of Mind
Thresholds
By adopting the Walker Process materiality and state of mind thresholds, a
"patent fraud" defense would require meeting the following two-prong test: (1)
clear and convincing evidence of a highly material omission or misrepresentation
rising to the level of either (a) the "objective but for" materiality standard or (b)
the "subjective but for" materiality standard; and (2) clear and convincing
evidence of a state of mind rising to the level of either (a) knowledge of the
omission or misrepresentation and knowledge of its high materiality or (b) an
intent to deceive the Patent Office.165
With respect to the materiality prong, the "objective but for" or "subjective
but for" test would be required. Thus, in effect, the "objective but for" standard
would be the threshold materiality standard. Evidence meeting the "but may
have," "reasonable examiner," or modern Rule 56 materiality standards would not
be sufficient.
With respect to the state of mind prong, intent or knowledge regarding
materiality would be required. Thus, in effect, knowledge regarding materiality
would be the threshold state of mind requirement Recklessness, gross negligence,
or negligence regarding materiality would not be sufficient In other words, an
inference of knowledge regarding materiality would not be allowed. Instead,
either both knowledge of the omission or misrepresentation and knowledge of its
163. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071.
164. Id. at 1070-71.
165. Figure 1 in the Appendix indicates the threshold materiality and state of mind standards
associated with the proposed "patent fraud" defense. Figure 2 then identifies appropriate combinations
of specific degrees of materiality and state of mind to prove "patent fraud."
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high materiality, or intent to deceive, would need to be proven by direct
evidence.166
As shown, this proposal for a "patent fraud" defense largely incorporates the
materiality and state of mind standards required to prove a Walker Process
antitrust claim. A "patent fraud" defense would not, however, require proof of
exclusionary power in terms of the relevant market for the relevant product,
which is an additional requirement of Walker Process antitrust claims. 167 Nor
would it include a remedy of treble damages, unlike Walker Process antitrust
claims.' 68 There is no reason to adopt the requirement to prove market power or
to provide damages for a successful showing of "patent fraud." Indeed, these two
aspects of Walker Process antitrust claims are directly related; the remedy of
treble damages is particularly appropriate when a patentee has obtained a
monopoly in the relevant market.'69
While the Federal Circuit has seemingly justified the heightened materiality
and state of mind standards for Walker Process antitrust claims by highlighting the
ability to obtain treble damages for a Walker Process antitrust violation, 17 0 the
ability to obtain treble damages justifies the requirement to show market power in
the relevant market. The ability to obtain treble damages is not the driving force
for the heightened materiality and state of mind standards behind Walker Process
antitrust claims; the requirement to prove fraud on the Patent Office is.
There are many justifications for adopting the heightened materiality and
state of mind standards in the context of the inequitable conduct defense,
including the many problems with the current law of inequitable conduct.' 7
Moreover, the ability to obtain a judgment of unenforceability of a patent and its
related patents (through the doctrine of "infectious unenforceability") justifies the
use of heightened materiality and state of mind standards in a "patent fraud"
defense.
On the one hand, this proposal for a "patent fraud" defense would reject
several aspects of the current law of inequitable conduct In particular, it would
eliminate the ability to rely on lesser standards of materiality or state of mind
because it would eliminate the ability of courts to balance materiality and state of
mind. On the other hand, the remedies for proving "patent fraud" would remain
166. The ability to prove "patent fraud" by proving knowledge of an omission or
misrepresentation and high materiality would, in effect, be allowing a limited inference of an intent to
deceive.
167. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (noting
the need to "appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market
for the product involved").
168. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006); see also Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 176-77 (noting availability of
treble damages under section 4 of Clayton Act in event patent is procured in violation of section 2 of
Sherman Act).
169. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070. The Federal Circuit has recognized that an allegation of
Walker Process fraud is a sword, not a shield. Id.
170. Id.




the same as the current remedies for proving inequitable conduct:
unenforceability of the patent at issue, potential "infectious unenforceability," and
attorney fees.
Significantly, if this "patent fraud" defense replaced the current inequitable
conduct defense, it would continue to encourage compliance with the duties of
candor, good faith, and disclosure in dealings with the Patent Office, while raising
the bar such that inequitable conduct might not be alleged in "every major patent
case."17 2 It likely would eliminate problems associated with overenforcement of
the inequitable conduct defense-namely disclosure of nonmaterial prior art-
ultimately increasing the quality of examination of disclosed prior art by the
Patent Office. It also likely would reduce the average cost of patent litigation on
both litigants and the public, increase the quality of legal representation of
patentees in patent infringement lawsuits by allowing the attorneys that
prosecuted the applications at the Patent Office to represent the patentee in
litigation, decrease the influence of inequitable conduct allegations on
considerations of issues like infringement and invalidity, and reduce the
frequency (albeit increase the impact) of allegations that harm the reputations of
inventors, patent attorneys, and the patent system itself.
Although it might be argued that adoption of a "patent fraud" defense would
encourage patent applicants to take a head-in-the-sand approach to prior art, this
concern is ill-founded. Indeed, the current law does not require patent applicants
to search for prior art.17 1 Moreover, any remaining concern regarding non-
disclosure of prior art to the Patent Office could be remedied by another reform
discussed in more detail below: eliminating the clear and convincing standard for
proving invalidity based on material prior art not disclosed to or considered by
the Patent Office.174
For all of these reasons, a "patent fraud" paradigm should be adopted to
replace the current law governing the inequitable conduct defense.
B. Making It More Difficult to Infer Intent to Deceive
At a minimum, and as an alternative to the adoption of a "patent fraud"
paradigm, proof of more than gross negligence should be required to infer intent
to deceive and prove inequitable conduct.
1. Inequitable Conduct as Distinct from Fraud
A hurdle for a court considering the adoption of a "patent fraud" paradigm to
replace the current law governing the inequitable conduct defense is precedent
indicating that inequitable conduct involves more than just fraud. In Precision
Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.,s 75 for
172. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting plague
"of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case").
173. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a) (listing requirements for non-provisional patent application).
174. See infra Part IV.C.3 for a discussion of a potential preponderance standard for invalidity.
175. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
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example, the Supreme Court recognized the "paramount interest in seeing that
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable
conduct."116 This reference to "fraud or other inequitable conduct" implies that
fraud is a type of inequitable conduct, but that inequitable conduct is broader than
fraud. The Court, however, has not suggested the bounds of inequitable conduct.
Indeed, the Court has not had the opportunity to address a case involving
inequitable conduct in a form other than fraud, so any reference to "other
inequitable conduct" is dicta.177
Because the Supreme Court has not had occasion to address the defense of
inequitable conduct outside of circumstances involving fraud, the development of
the inequitable conduct defense has been left to the lower courts, including most
recently the Federal Circuit' 78 The Federal Circuit, for its part, has distinguished
the concept of inequitable conduct from common law fraud and Walker Process
fraud.179
According to the Federal Circuit, "inequitable conduct is a broader, more
inclusive concept than the common law fraud needed to support a Walker Process"
claim.1so In the court's words: "Inequitable conduct in fact is a lesser offense than
common law fraud, and includes types of conduct less serious than 'knowing and
willful' fraud."'8 1 This conclusion is evident from the fact that the current law of
inequitable conduct does not require a showing of reliance and injury, whereas
176. Precision Instrument Mfg., 324 U.S. at 816 (emphasis added).
177. In Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., for example, the Court addressed facts
involving an agreement to suppress evidence of prior use that would have invalidated the patent. 290
U.S. 240, 243 (1933). While the district court found that the use of a prior judgment entered without the
benefit of the suppressed evidence was "not a fraud upon the court," the appellate court disagreed and
the Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 244, 247. In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., the Court
addressed facts involving "a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only the
Patent Office but the Circuit Court of Appeals." 322 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1944), overruled on othergrounds
by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976). In particular, this "fraud ... had its genesis in the
plan to publish an article for the deliberate purpose of deceiving the Patent Office. The plan was
executed, and the article was put to fraudulent use in the Patent Office, contrary to law." Id. at 250. And
in Precision Instrument Manufacturing, the Court addressed facts involving "fraud" in the form of
"perjury-tainted patents and contracts," where a patent "application was admittedly based upon false
data." 324 U.S. at 816.
178. See Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting
that Supreme Court has articulated what constitutes a material misrepresentation standard and
explaining different materiality standards developed by Federal Circuit and other courts).
179. Fraud requires "(1) a representation of a material fact, (2) the falsity of that representation,
(3) the intent to deceive (or an equivalent recklessness), (4) justifiable reliance by the deceived party,
and (5) injury to the deceived party." Agfa Corp. v. Creo Prods. Inc., 451 F.3d 1366, 1375 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (citing Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 792-93 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). By contrast, "reliance and injury
are not elements of today's inequitable conduct defense." Id (citing Norton, 433 F.2d at 792-93). Note
that the first two factors listed in Agfa represent two concepts embedded in the first factor listed in C.R
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc. See supra note 152 for the list of factors required by the C.R Bard court. Also
note that the last factor listed in C.R. Bard is a specific application to patent prosecution of the last factor
listed in Agfa. Thus, the standards articulated for fraud and Walker Process fraud in C.R Bard and Agfa
do not differ in any relevant respect.




common law fraud does. Moreover, under the current law the threshold
materiality and state of mind standards for inequitable conduct are lower than the
threshold materiality and state of mind standards for Walker Process fraud, as
already discussed. Thus, to adopt a conception of inequitable conduct as "patent
fraud," certainly the Federal Circuit would need to revisit and overrule its
precedent.
2. Increasing the State of Mind Standard for Inequitable Conduct
To the extent that a "patent fraud" paradigm is not adopted, at a minimum
the state of mind standard-the degree of intent-for inequitable conduct should
be increased. As discussed above, it appears that various Federal Circuit judges
believe that the law of inequitable conduct should require something more than
gross negligence (and certainly negligence), even when the level of materiality of
omissions or misrepresentations is high. A first option is eliminating any ability to
rely upon something less than intent or knowledge regarding materiality-in
other words, eliminating the ability to rely on recklessness, gross negligence, or
negligence, even if combined with a showing of high materiality. Such a reform
would likely go far in eliminating the plague of inequitable conduct allegations and
many of the costs and inefficiencies associated with the current law of inequitable
conduct. Like the "patent fraud" paradigm, however, this would be a significant
divergence from the current law.
A second option is to set the threshold state of mind standard at recklessness
when the evidence proves that omissions or misrepresentations are highly
material. In other words, this second option would eliminate the ability to rely
upon gross negligence or negligence even if the evidence shows omissions or
misrepresentations are highly material. This level of reform still would reduce the
number of inequitable conduct allegations and many of the costs and inefficiencies
associated with the current law of inequitable conduct, but it would not be as
significant a divergence from the current law. While this reform would leave
undisturbed the requirement to show knowledge or intent regarding omissions or
misrepresentations meeting only the modern Rule 56, "but may have," or
"reasonable examiner" materiality standards, it would require only recklessness
regarding omissions or misrepresentations meeting either of the "subjective but
for" or "objective but for" materiality standards. 182
It is helpful to look outside the context of the Federal Circuit's inequitable
conduct doctrine and into other circuits' considerations of state of mind
requirements in similar contexts. For example, consider that section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits fraud in securities transactions.183
Notably, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that every circuit considering the issue
has held that securities fraud under section 10(b) may be established by a
182. Figure 1 in the Appendix indicates the possibility of increasing the state of mind threshold for
inequitable conduct to recklessness. Figure 2 applies this heightened state of mind threshold to various
combinations of materiality and state of mind.
183. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2009).
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showing of recklessness.184 Thus, adoption of recklessness as the threshold to infer
intent to deceive for inequitable conduct purposes would be consistent with every
other circuits' consideration of the threshold required to infer intent to deceive in
the context of securities fraud.
There is recent precedent for the Federal Circuit replacing a common law
negligence standard with a recklessness standard. In In re Seagate Technology,
LLC,1ss the en banc Federal Circuit addressed the standard of proof required to
prove willful infringement. In that case, the court eliminated what had become
known as the "duty of due care" to avoid infringement.' The court found that
the duty of [due] care ... sets a lower threshold for willful infringement
that is more akin to negligence. This standard fails to comport with the
general understanding of willfulness in the civil context, and it allows
for punitive damages in a manner inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent. Accordingly, we overrule the [duty of due care] standard ...
and hold that proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced
damages requires at least a showing of objective recklessness.187
Thus, the Federal Circuit overruled its precedent by requiring recklessness,
instead of mere negligence, to prove willfulness.' Notably, the court based its
reversal of precedent on the fact that willfulness is a ground for punitive damages
under 35 U.S.C. § 284, and Supreme Court precedent does not allow for punitive
damages based on negligence.' 89
While inequitable conduct is not a ground for punitive damages under 35
U.S.C. § 284, the holding of Seagate could nevertheless be applied to the law of
inequitable conduct to eliminate a negligence-based standard, because holding a
patent unenforceable for inequitable conduct is also an act of punishment. 90 To
the extent the duty of disclosure sets a threshold for inequitable conduct that is
more akin to negligence, it allows for a form of punishment-unenforceability of
the relevant patent or patents-in a manner that likewise is inconsistent with
184. Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Hudson v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989); Van Dyke v. Coburn Enters., 873 F.2d 1094,
1100 (8th Cir. 1989); McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989);
Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d
929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023-25
(6th Cir. 1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v.
Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1977)).
185. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
186. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
187. Id. (citations omitted).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1368, 1371.
190. See Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp. N.V., 528 F.3d 1365, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(noting that a finding of inequitable conduct comes "with the punishment of unenforceability of the
entire patent" (emphasis added)). By contrast, an award of attorney fees is not a matter of punitive
damages. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (en banc). Thus, it is of no moment that, like inequitable conduct, willful infringement is a
basis to award attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. See S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.,




Supreme Court precedent.19' As a result, an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit
could hold-similar to Seagate-that proof of inequitable conduct resulting in the
unenforceability of patents requires at least a showing of recklessness.
In Seagate, the Federal Circuit defined the level of conduct necessary to meet
its new, heightened recklessness standard for willful infringement:
[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high
likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent. The
state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective
inquiry. If this threshold objective standard is satisfied, the patentee
must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk (determined by
the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known
or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused
infringer.192
Thus, for purposes of willfulness, the recklessness standard includes two prongs:
(a) clear and convincing evidence of action despite an objectively high likelihood
of infringement of a valid patent and (b) evidence that the infringer knew or
should have known of the objectively high likelihood of infringement.
Likewise, an en banc Federal Circuit could define the level of conduct
necessary to meet a new, heightened recklessness standard for inequitable
conduct. In particular, it might hold that to establish inequitable conduct, an
alleged infringer is required to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
patent applicant acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted either (a) failure to disclose known, highly material information to the
Patent Office or (b) disclosure of known, highly material misinformation to the
Patent Office. (Highly material would refer to evidence establishing by clear and
convincing evidence the "objective but for" or "subjective but for" standards of
materiality.) The state of mind of the patent applicant would not be relevant to
this objective inquiry.'93 If this threshold objective standard was satisfied, the
patent applicant also would be required to demonstrate that the objectively-
defined risk (determined by the record developed during invalidity proceedings)
was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the patent
applicant.19 4
191. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983) (indicating that recklessness is an appropriate
standard for punitive damages).
192. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (citation omitted).
193. While the use of the word "known" might seem to collapse this articulation of a "recklessness"
state of mind into the higher "knowledge" state of mind, the modifier "objectively high likelihood" and
the absence of any actual requirement to identify the state of mind of the patent applicant sufficiently
distinguishes the two degrees.
194. Note that even this formation of a recklessness standard involves the language "should have
known," which sounds like negligence. Significantly, however, before the "should have known" portion




For all of these reasons, if a "patent fraud" paradigm is not adopted to replace
the current law governing the inequitable conduct defense, the threshold state of
mind standard should be increased to knowledge or, at a minimum, recklessness.
C. Alternative Reforms
There are various other ways to reform the law of inequitable conduct, not
only to further address the problem of information asymmetry between patent
applicants and the Patent Office, but also to account for the plague of assertions of
inequitable conduct in patent litigation and the costs and inefficiencies this plague
creates. These reforms could be applied independently to the current law of
inequitable conduct; they could be combined with an adoption of the "patent
fraud" paradigm; they could be combined with the adoption of a higher threshold
state of mind standard; or they could be combined with one another as
appropriate.
1. Returning Discretion to the Application of Remedies
One possible reform is to return judicial discretion to the application of
remedies for findings of inequitable conduct. A finding of inequitable conduct
currently results in a judgment of unenforceability of every claim in a patent, with
the possibility that related patents are also ruled unenforceable. In Kingsdown
Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.,' 95 the en banc Federal Circuit reaffirmed
the rule that "[w]hen a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct
occurred in relation to one or more claims during prosecution of [a] patent
application, the entire patent is rendered unenforceable." 196 This holding of
Kingsdown should be revisited.
A judgment of unenforceability is a very blunt instrument to deal with cases,
like those involving allegations of inequitable conduct, that involve such diverse
facts. Moreover, to the extent the current law provides a greater reward than
necessary or appropriate, an alleged infringer is provided too much incentive to
allege inequitable conduct, thereby contributing to the "plague" of inequitable
conduct allegations and all of its costs.
It should be recognized that in Kingsdown the en banc Federal Circuit actually
addressed two issues: (1) whether gross negligence alone is sufficient to prove
inequitable conduct, and (2) whether inequitable conduct, if proven, renders an
entire patent unenforceable.197 The fact that the court addressed both of these
concepts highlights the fact that the standard for proving inequitable conduct is
linked to the remedy. The Federal Circuit, in effect, decided that gross negligence
alone does not justify adjudicating an entire patent unenforceable, but that gross
negligence combined with additional facts may justify adjudicating an entire
patent unenforceable. The underlying concept is proportionality. 98
195. 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (relevant portion en banc).
196. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 877.
197. Id. at 876-77.
198. See Matthew M. Peters, The Equitable Inequitable: Adding Proportionality and Predictability to
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The return of discretion to trial courts would allow them to fashion remedies
proportional to particular instances of inequitable conduct. For example, the
remedy of "infectious unenforceability" should be reserved for the most egregious
conduct-combinations of the highest degrees of materiality and state of mind,
i.e., "patent fraud." An award of attorney fees should be reserved for combinations
that include one of the highest two standards for materiality combined with a
state of mind of at least recklessness. Unenforceability of the patent related to the
misconduct at issue should be reserved for situations in which the materiality or
state of mind falls within the highest two standards. And a negligent
misrepresentation or omission would justify reducing the standard for proving
invalidity from clear and convincing evidence to a preponderance of the evidence,
a concept discussed in more detail below.
Support for this reform can be drawn from the Supreme Court cases that
established the foundation of the inequitable conduct defense. These cases
indicate that the defense is based on the doctrine of unclean hands, itself an
equitable doctrine.199 Significantly, the Court emphasized in these cases that the
doctrine of unclean hands "necessarily gives wide range to the equity court's use
of discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant It is 'not bound by formula or
restrained by any limitation that tends to trammel the free and just exercise of
discretion." 200 In short, using their discretion, trial courts should be able to match
inequitable conduct standards and remedies. 20
2. Adopting a "Negligent Misrepresentation/Omission" Defense (Or Not)
Another potential reform is to introduce a "negligent misrepresentation/
omission" defense to the law of inequitable conduct, coupled with a reduced
remedy.202 This reform would be consistent with the idea of returning discretion
and proportionality to the application of remedies for findings of inequitable
conduct To prove that a patent applicant was guilty of a negligent
misrepresentation or omission, an alleged infringer would have to prove
materiality meeting one of the lowest three standards (the modern Rule 56 test,
the "but may have" test, or the "reasonable examiner" test), and prove a state of
mind meeting one of the lowest three standards (recklessness, gross negligence,
or negligence).
Inequitable Conduct in the Patent Reform Act of2008, 19 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 77, 108-09
(2008) (proposing scalable system of remedies for wrongdoing ranging from fines to invalidation of
claims to, in part, "add[] much needed proportionality to the [inequitable conduct] doctrine").
199. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 819 (1945) (citing
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245-46 (1933)) (stating that defendant's
conduct failed to meet standard necessary to maintain suit in equity).
200. Precision Instrument Mfg., 324 U.S. at 815 (quoting Keystone Driller, 290 U.S. at 245-46).
201. See infra Figure 2 in Appendix for a proposed sliding scale of remedies for the various
combinations of materiality and state of mind.
202. Under this approach, the clear and convincing standard for proving invalidity could be
replaced with a preponderance standard when a negligent misrepresentation or omission occurs. For
further discussion of this approach, see infra Part IV.C.3.
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While a "patent fraud" regime surely would reduce the number of allegations
of inequitable conduct, and a heightened state of mind standard for inequitable
conduct likely would do the same, a "negligent misrepresentation/omission"
defense that is easier to meet than the current inequitable conduct standard
would do the opposite. Thus, to the extent the current inequitable conduct defense
has created a plague of inequitable conduct allegations and created all sorts of
inefficiencies, it would be even more inefficient to sanction a "negligent
misrepresentation/omission" defense. While such a defense would encourage
patent applicants to comply with their duties of candor, good faith, and disclosure,
it would exacerbate the problems associated with the current law of inequitable
conduct. In particular, it would encourage even greater overdisclosure of prior art
to the Patent Office; further increase costs associated with patent infringement
litigation; impugn the reputations of even more patent attorneys and inventors;
provide additional opportunities to prevent attorneys from representing
patentees in litigation; and continue to negatively influence triers of fact on
unrelated issues such as infringement. 203  Thus, a "negligent
misrepresentation/omission" defense should not be adopted.
3. Adopting a Preponderance Invalidity Standard for Undisclosed and
Unconsidered Material Prior Art
Another potential reform is replacing the clear and convincing standard for
proving invalidity with a preponderance standard when the Patent Office was not
provided, or did not consider, material prior art. Materiality in this context could
be measured by any of the materiality standards. Reducing the standard of
proving invalidity for undisclosed or unconsidered material prior art would
encourage compliance with the duty of disclosure-indeed it would encourage
patent applicants to search for prior art and disclose prior art to the Patent Office
rather than stick their heads in the sand as the inequitable conduct doctrine
arguably does and as the adoption of a "patent fraud" paradigm might do. As a
result, it would correct the information asymmetry between patent applicants and
the Patent Office. 204 Whether the replacement of the clear and convincing
203. Figure 1 in the Appendix indicates the possibility of adopting a "negligent
misrepresentation/omission" defense to a charge of patent infringement While a "negligent
misrepresentation/omission" defense should not be adopted, its use in Figure 1 serves as a placeholder
for a different type of reform introduced below: elimination of the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard to prove invalidity for material prior art not disclosed or considered by the Patent Office.
Figure 2 highlights combinations of materiality and state of mind that would not support any form of
defense, not even a "negligent misrepresentation/omission" defense. These combinations also form a
placeholder for another reform introduced below, the shifting of attorney fees. See infra Part IV.C.4 for a
discussion of the possibility of shifting attorney fees.
204. Applying a preponderance standard to the question of invalidity when prior art has not been
considered by the Patent Office would encourage patent applicants to search for prior art and disclose it
to the Patent Office, a seemingly beneficial result. See Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable Conduct
Claims in the 21st Century: Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 170-71 (2005) (noting that
lowering standard to preponderance of evidence would lessen any fears that patents would be
perceived as less worthy). On the other hand, another school of thought is that the best examination of
patent claims is in patent infringement litigation, not at the Patent Office. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational
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standard with a preponderance standard would simultaneously reduce the
number of inequitable conduct assertions or reduce the amount of work for
parties and courts would depend on its implementation.
If this reform were adopted without any other change to the current law of
inequitable conduct, it likely would not reduce the number of allegations of
inequitable conduct, although it would increase the viability of invalidity defenses
at the expense of the inequitable conduct defense. This reform, however, when
combined with other reforms to the inequitable conduct doctrine has the potential
to significantly reduce transaction costs affecting litigants and courts (and
ultimately the public) by reducing allegations of inequitable conduct while
maintaining incentives to disclose material prior art to the Patent Office.
This reform could be implemented in several ways, including, as discussed
above, as a remedy for a negligent misrepresentation or omission. A better
implementation of this reform, however, is to institute a strict liability approach
when a patent applicant fails to disclose material prior art to the Patent Office-
such that state of mind would not matter.205 This implementation would still
require determining materiality, but it would eliminate the need of a court or jury
to analyze the difficult issue of one's state of mind. The best option is to adopt this
reform in its strict liability form simultaneously with the adoption of the "patent
fraud" paradigm, because this combination of reforms would substantially reduce
the number of inequitable conduct allegations while still providing a strong
incentive to disclose prior art to the Patent Office.
Another potential implementation of this reform includes combining it with
an elimination of lower tests for materiality with respect to inequitable conduct-
namely the modern Rule 56, the "may have been," and the "reasonable examiner"
standards. These materiality tests could then be left to the question of whether the
standard for proving invalidity should be reduced for prior art references not
disclosed to, or considered by, the Patent Office. This implementation would avoid
adding an extra layer to the inequitable conduct doctrine and would, instead,
permit removal of a layer, likely resulting in a reduction of the number of
allegations of inequitable conduct in patent infringement litigation.
To understand the basis for this proposal to reduce the standard for proving
invalidity when prior art is not disclosed to or considered by the Patent Office, it is
helpful to understand (1) the "presumption of validity," (2) the various regional
circuits' and Federal Circuit's interpretation of the "presumption of validity," and
(3) Supreme Court authority on point
In Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc.,206 the
Supreme Court reviewed various regional circuits' formulations of the standard to
prove invalidity of issued patents. 207 It noted that "[a] patent regularly issued, and
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2001) (concluding that Patent Office
"doesn't do a very detailed job of examining patents, but we probably don't want it to" because of cost
and fact that "overwhelming majority of patents are never litigated or even licensed").
205. Both of these alternatives are indicated in Figure 2 in the Appendix.
206. 293 U.S. 1 (1934).
207. Radio Corp. ofAmerica, 293 U.S. at 7-8.
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even more obviously a patent issued after a hearing of all the rival claimants, is
presumed to be valid until the presumption has been overcome by convincing
evidence of error."2 08 It concluded that "one otherwise an infringer who assails the
validity of a patentfair upon its face bears a heavy burden of persuasion, and fails
unless his evidence has more than a dubious preponderance."209 By focusing on
patents "regularly issued" and "fair upon [their] face," and moreover by
highlighting patents "issued after a hearing of all the rival claimants," the Court
left open the door to a lesser standard for proving invalidity in certain
circumstances.
In Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp.,210 the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that a patent secured by false evidence is not entitled to the
presumption of validity.211 Notably, however, it held that the allegedly false
evidence-affidavits-"though perhaps reckless, were not the basis for [the
granting of the patent] or essentially material to its issue. The reasonable
presumption of validity furnished by the grant of the patent therefore would not
seem to be destroyed."212 Thus, the Court left open the door that false evidence
relied upon by the Patent Office or material to the issuance of the patent may
overcome or at least affect the application of the presumption of the patent's
validity.
The statutory presumption of validity, codified after Radio Corp. and Corona
Cord Tire in the Patent Act of 1952, requires that every patent be "presumed
valid."213 In practical terms, this presumption means that the alleged infringer
bears, in the statute's terms, the "burden of establishing invalidity."214 The statute,
however, does not define exactly what this burden is.215
After Radio Corp., Corona Cord Tire, and the codification of the presumption
of validity-but prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit-various regional
circuits interpreted the statutory presumption of validity and the undefined
statutory burden and concluded that they allow for the alleged infringer to prove
invalidity by a preponderance of the evidence in certain situations, such as when
"relevant,"216 "significant,"217 "pertinent," 218 "more pertinent,"219 or the "most
208. Id. at 7 (emphases added).
209. Id. at 8 (emphases added).
210. 276 U.S. 358 (1928).
211. Corona Cord Tire, 276 U.S. at 374.
212. Id. (emphasis added)
213. "A patent shall be presumed valid.... The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any
claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity." 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. E.g., Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1982); Futorian Mfg. Corp. v. Dual
Mfg. & Eng'g, Inc., 528 F.2d 941, 943 (1st Cir. 1976); Cont'l Can Co. v. Old Dominion Box Co., 393 F.2d
321, 326 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968); Marston v. J.C. Penney Co., 353 F.2d 976,982 (4th Cir. 1965).
217. E.g, U.S. Expansion Bolt Co. v. Jordan Indus., Inc., 488 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1973).
218. E.g., Mfg. Research Corp. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 679 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 1982);
Turzillo v. P & Z Mergentime, 532 F.2d 1393, 1399-1400 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Purina Co. v. Gen. Foods Corp.,
442 F.2d 389, 390 (8th Cir. 1971); c.f Preformed Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 265, 271
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pertinent"220 prior art was not considered by the Patent Office, if unconsidered
prior art led one to "reasonably question" the Patent Office's decision,221 or just
because a single prior art reference was not considered by the Patent Office.222
The Federal Circuit, however, has interpreted the statutory presumption of
validity and the undefined statutory burden to mean that an alleged infringer
must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence regardless of any other
consideration. 223 The court has explained that the basis for the presumption of
validity and this heightened standard is that the Patent Office is presumed to have
performed its duties correctly.224 But even when an invalidity defense is based on
prior art not considered by the Patent Office during a patent's prosecution, and
even if that prior art is more material than the prior art considered by the Patent
Office, the Federal Circuit still requires that invalidity be proven using a clear and
convincing evidence standard.225 The Federal Circuit has gone so far as to say that
the presumption of validity "is never annihilated, destroyed, or even weakened,
regardless of what facts are of record."226
The Supreme Court has not resolved the conflict between the Federal Circuit
and its sister circuits. In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 227 the Court
specifically declined to reach the question whether the failure to disclose a prior
art reference during prosecution voids the presumption of validity given to issued
patents.228 It did note, however, "that the rationale underlying the presumption-
that the [Patent Office], in its expertise, has approved the claim-seems much
diminished" in this situation.229 Thus, there is reason to think that the Supreme
Court would be receptive to the reform proposed here-reducing the burden of
proving invalidity when material prior art is not disclosed to, or considered by, the
Patent Office.
(6th Cir. 1964) (stating that failure to consider pertinent prior art weakens, but does not necessarily
destroy, presumption of validity).
219. C.f Power Curbers, Inc. v. E.D. Etnyre & Co., 298 F.2d 484, 493 (4th Cir. 1962) (affirming
district court's reasoning that defendant's failure to introduce "more pertinent" prior unconsidered art
strengthened presumption of validity).
220. E.g., Jaybee Mfg. Corp. v. Ajax Hardware Mfg. Corp., 287 F.2d 228, 229 (9th Cir. 1961).
221. Plastic Container Corp. v. Cont'l Plastics of Okla., Inc., 708 F.2d 1554, 1558 (10th Cir. 1983)
(noting that "[t]he crucial inquiry is not the relative pertinence of the prior unconsidered art; instead, it
is whether the unconsidered art leads the court to reasonably question the [Patent Office's] decision").
222. See, e.g., Henry Mfg. Co. v. Commercial Filters Corp., 489 F.2d 1008, 1013 (7th Cir. 1972)
(stating that presumption of validity can be defeated by evidence that Patent Office failed to consider
even a single prior art reference).
223. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
224. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The 'presumption of
validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 carries with it a presumption that the Examiner did his duty and knew
what claims he was allowing." (quoting Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 1989))).
225. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (using clear and
convincing evidence standard where prior art was not considered by Patent Office).
226. ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
227. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
228. KSR Int'I Co., 550 U.S. at 426.
229. Id.
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4. Shifting Attorney Fees
To "vaccinate" patent cases against the "plague" of inequitable conduct
charges, one possibility is to assess attorney fees against parties unable to sustain
their burden of proving inequitable conduct 230 This reform could be implemented
in various forms. On one hand, parties might be held strictly liable for alleging but
failing to prove inequitable conduct. On the other hand, parties might be ordered
to pay a patentee's attorney fees only if an allegation of inequitable conduct is
found to be baseless. Either form of fee shifting would act as a deterrent against
baseless assertions of inequitable conduct. And while a strict liability regime
would be more efficient-eliminating any secondary issues for a judge or jury to
resolve after reaching a conclusion of no inequitable conduct-this efficiency
would not come without a cost, as a strict liability regime would act as a deterrent
to legitimate assertions of inequitable conduct based on questionable activities by
patent applicants.
It probably would require action by Congress to implement a strict liability
regime for failing to prove inequitable conduct, given that fee shifting is
contradictory to the prevailing common law in the United States and no current
statute requires it 231 The idea of Congress implementing such a regime, however,
is not a new one. The first statute governing the issuance and enforcement of
patents in the United States, the Patent Act of 1790, authorized private parties to
file lawsuits against patentees "within one year" after the issuance of a patent as a
way to repeal patents "obtained surreptitiously by, or upon false suggestion."232
Significantly, if a plaintiff failed in its attempt to show that the patent was
"obtained surreptitiously by, or upon false suggestion," the plaintiff was required
to "pay all such costs as the defendant shall be put to in defending the suit."233 The
Patent Act of 1793 extended the time period to three years for a party to seek a
repeal on this basis, but maintained the requirement to shift fees when the
plaintiff was unsuccessful. 234 This fee-shifting requirement, however, ended when
the Patent Act of 1836 omitted any provision whatsoever regarding the repeal of
patents. 235
By contrast, although rarely if ever applied in this context, in theory the
current law already supports fee shifting for baseless assertions of inequitable
conduct. First, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an avenue
230. See Kevin Mack, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality Cleansing Unclean
Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 172 (2006) (stating that fee-shifting mechanism could be introduced
to deter parties from "frivolously pleading inequitable conduct").
231. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991) (noting that, although "American Rule"
bars fee shifting in most cases, there are three narrowly defined circumstances where federal courts
have inherent power to assess attorney fees).
232. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793).
233. Id. § 5 ("[hlf the party at whose complaint the process issued, shall have judgment given
against him, he shall pay all such costs as the defendant shall be put to in defending the suit, to be taxed
by the court, and recovered in such manner as costs expended by defendants, shall be recovered in due
course of law.").
234. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat 318, 323 (repealed 1836).
235. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat 117 (repealed 1842).
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to shift fees in the face of a baseless assertion of inequitable conduct.236 A baseless
assertion of inequitable conduct might be presented to harass the patentee or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation, or it might be presented based on factual
assertions without evidentiary support or likely evidentiary support in the record.
In these circumstances, Rule 11 allows courts to impose "an appropriate
sanction."237 An appropriate sanction may include an award of attorney fees and
other expenses directly resulting from the violation of Rule 11.238 Second, the
Patent Act itself authorizes courts "in exceptional cases [to] award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party."239 A case involving a baseless assertion of
inequitable conduct probably qualifies as an "exceptional case" and justifies
awarding the patentee its attorney fees.240
5. Professional Certifications
Another potential reform to the law of inequitable conduct is to require that,
before a defense of inequitable conduct can be alleged in court, a licensed patent
attorney241 file a statement such as the following: "Based on my professional
judgment, I believe [insert names of particular people] committed inequitable
conduct during the prosecution of [insert patent number(s)] based on my review
of the evidence." While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 already effectively
requires attorneys to make this statement implicitly, an express statement of this
sort is not required. An express statement, however, would cause an attorney to
think twice before impugning the integrity of a fellow patent attorney. Moreover,
the requirement that a licensed patent attorney-not just any attorney-supply
the express statement would cause patent attorneys in "glass houses" to think
twice before casting the first stone. Presumably local patent rules, now the rage in
district courts across the country,242 could include the requirement for such a
professional certification. Indeed, the Federal Circuit itself requires similar
statements to be filed with petitions for hearing or rehearing en banc.243
236. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (providing for sanctions where specified misrepresentations to court are
made).
237. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1).
238. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). There are, however, express limitations on monetary sanctions.
Monetary sanctions may not be imposed on a represented party for nonfrivolous arguments to extend
existing law or establish new law, or sua sponte unless the court issues a show-cause order prior to
voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by the entity to be sanctioned. FED. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(5).
239. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
240. Figure 2 in the Appendix provides examples of when fee shifting might be appropriate.
241. To practice in front of the Patent Office, an attorney must meet certain scientific and technical
qualifications (e.g., an engineering degree) and pass a separate bar exam. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.7 (2009)
(noting the requirements for individuals to practice include "the legal, scientific, and technical
qualifications necessary").
242. Douglas C. Muth et al., The Local Patent Rules Bandwagon, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. I., August
2009, at 19, 19 ("The number of districts with local patent rules has nearly tripled in less than four
years.").
243. See FED. CIR. R. 35(b)(1) (requiring petition for appeal to be heard initially by en banc panel to




Yet another potential reform involves the Patent Office providing
administrative review of inequitable conduct allegations. In 1982, the Patent
Office began investigating allegations of inequitable conduct. 244 Shortly thereafter,
however, in 1988 the Patent Office largely stopped its investigations.245 It has
since articulated persuasive reasons why inequitable conduct should not be
handled by the Patent Office during ex parte proceedings. Those reasons include
the inability of the Patent Office to subpoena documents and witnesses; the
inability to observe the demeanor of witnesses subjected to cross-examination;
the inability to fashion any tailored equitable remedies to fit cases in which
inequitable conduct is established; the inappropriateness of an administrative
body to address an equitable doctrine developed by courts and not set by statute;
and the reality that, because of the lack of tools in the Patent Office to thoroughly
vet allegations of inequitable conduct and the inability of parties adverse to the
patent applicant to participate in any resolution in the Patent Office would
provide no resolution of the issue for either the patentee or any adverse parties-
and be expensive to boot.246
Significantly, however, many of these reasons do not apply to adversarial,
inter partes proceedings. The Patent Office, for example, does consider allegations
of inequitable conduct during what are called "interference" proceedings. 247
Interference proceedings are inter partes proceedings. Another type of inter
partes proceeding that might be appropriate is an opposition proceeding. For
example, Congress might establish a postissuance opposition period that provides
the public with an opportunity to file complaints regarding inequitable conduct
committed during the prosecution of issued patents and to engage in inter partes
proceedings to resolve those complaints. The parties could be given subpoena
power and the Patent Office's resolution of the issue could be binding on the party
filing the opposition.24 8
requires an answer to one or more precedent-setting questions of exceptional importance . ); FED.
ClR. R 35(b)(2) (requiring that petition for appeal to be reheard en banc include one of the following
statements by counsel: "Based on my professional judgment, I believe the panel decision is contrary to
the following decision(s)"; or, "[b]ased on my professional judgment, I believe this appeal requires an
answer to one or more precedent-setting questions of exceptional importance").
244. See Mack, supra note 230, at 174 (noting that Patent Office amended Rule 56 in 1982 to allow
for rejections of patent applications based on inequitable conduct).
245. Id. at 175.
246. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2010 (8th ed.,
rev. 7, 2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm (follow "2000 PDF"
hyperlink).
247. Id. ("Issues of fraud and/or inequitable conduct in an interference proceeding before the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) will be considered by the Board....').
248. There are various other possible reforms to address the information asymmetry between
patent applicants and the Patent Office without modifying the standards governing the inequitable
conduct defense. See generally, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763 (2002). And, of course, there are other possible reforms to the inequitable
conduct doctrine itself that would reduce costs associated with over-use of the doctrine as a defense to a
charge of patent infringement. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable
2010]1 93
TEMPLE LAWREVIEW
Congress could make these postissuance, inter partes proceedings at the
Patent Office the exclusive forum for resolution of inequitable conduct claims. If
Congress did so, the expertise of the Patent Office for handling such claims would
be harnessed, while the pernicious effects on the court system and patent
infringement litigation would be eliminated. And even if these proceedings were
not made the exclusive forum for resolution of inequitable conduct claims, they
would presumably reduce the need for resolution by courts.
V. IMPLEMENTING APPROPRIATE REFORMS: WHO SHOULD ACT?
Once all potential reforms to the law of inequitable conduct are on the table,
the next question is: Who will evaluate and institute the most helpful and practical
reforms-Congress, the Patent Office, district courts, the Federal Circuit, or the
Supreme Court? As will be shown, each has a role to play in selecting and
implementing appropriate reforms to the inequitable conduct defense.
A. Congress
Congress currently is considering the first significant reform to the patent
laws in over fifty-five years. While the patent laws have remained relatively the
same since the Patent Act of 1952,249 Congress has recently considered reforming
various areas of patent law, including the law of inequitable conduct For example,
in 2007 the House of Representatives and the Senate considered bills that would
have codified the law of inequitable conduct. 250
The 2007 House bill would have required that inequitable conduct pleadings
comply with Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; defined materiality
in terms similar to the modern Rule 56 standard articulated by the Patent Office;
defined intent to deceive as requiring "specific facts beyond materiality" showing
"conscious or deliberate behavior;" provided various possible remedies for
inequitable conduct; and allowed courts to refer patent attorneys to the Patent
Office for appropriate disciplinary action when there was evidence that
inequitable conduct was attributable to them.251
The 2007 Senate bill included some but not all of these reforms. It would
have required that inequitable conduct pleadings comply with Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; defined materiality in terms similar to the
modern Rule 56 standard; defined intent largely by adopting the holding of
Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 774-81 (2009) (noting that costs would be reduced by,
inter alia, minimizing remedies; maintaining a specific, independent standard of intent; and prohibiting
submission of cumulative, nonmaterial art).
249. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in various sections of Title 35
of the United States Code).
250. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12 (2007) (providing defense to
allegation of patent infringement if individuals with duty of disclosure intended to mislead patent
examiner with regard to material information); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 12
(2007) (same).
251. H.R. 1908 § 12.
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Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Inc. v. Hollister Inc., 252 such that gross negligence
alone would be insufficient to prove inequitable conduct; and provided various
possible remedies for inequitable conduct. 253
On the one hand, some of the reforms considered by Congress are not
necessary. For example, in light of the recent Exergen decision, there is no need to
codify the requirement that inequitable conduct pleadings comply with Rule 9(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 254 Furthermore, there is no reason for
courts to refer patent attorneys to the Patent Office for appropriate disciplinary
action when there was evidence that inequitable conduct was attributable to
them. The Patent Office already has an Office of Enrollment and Discipline that is,
or at least should be, analyzing court decisions on inequitable conduct, conducting
necessary investigations, and disciplining attorneys for misconduct.255
On the other hand, other reforms considered by Congress should be adopted.
For example, as discussed above, trial courts should be given discretion to adopt
various possible remedies for inequitable conduct.256 Congress should also clarify
the materiality and state of mind thresholds for proving inequitable conduct. In
particular, Congress should adopt the "patent fraud" paradigm for inequitable
conduct discussed in this Article. 257 In addition, Congress should clarify the
standard for proving invalidity when the Patent Office was not provided or did not
consider material prior art, replace the Federal Circuit's clear and convincing
standard with a preponderance of the evidence standard in this situation, 258 and
consider a strict liability standard for shifting attorney fees in cases where
inequitable conduct is not proven.259 Finally, Congress should include in any
postissuance opposition period an opportunity for the public to file complaints
regarding inequitable conduct committed during the prosecution of issued patents
and to engage in inter partes proceedings to resolve those complaints. 260
252. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(relevant portion en banc) (holding that materiality and intent must both be proven by clear and
convincing evidence and that "gross negligence" does not "of itself justify an inference of intent to
deceive").
253. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007).
254. See supra Part III.C.4. for a discussion of Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2009), which held that inequitable conduct pleadings must satisfy Rule 9(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
255. See Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 319-20 (1949) (noting that Congress intended for
Commissioner of Patents, not courts, to protect public from consequences of patent-attorney
misconduct); Klein v. Peterson, 866 F.2d 412, 416-17 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (indicating that patent attorneys
must deal with Patent Office in honest manner and that failure to do so is ground for sanctions);
laskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053, 1059-61 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (affirming in part and reversing in
part Patent Office's decision to discipline patent attorney for misconduct).
256. See supra Part IV.C.1 for a discussion of the proposal to give district courts more power to
assess appropriate remedies.
257. See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the "patent fraud" paradigm.
258. See supra Part IV.C.3 for an argument that the clear and convincing standard for proving
invalidity should be replaced with a preponderance of the evidence standard.
259. See supra Part IV.C.4 for a discussion of when shifting attorney fees would be appropriate in
the inequitable conduct context.
260. See supra Part IV.C.6 for a discussion of the Patent Office providing administrative review of
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Unfortunately, the most recent patent reform bills being considered by the
House of Representatives and the Senate do not include any reforms to the law of
inequitable conduct.261 Congress should amend these bills to address and correct
the significant problems associated with the current law of inequitable conduct.
B. Patent Office
The Patent Office should consider and adopt appropriate reforms to assist
the courts in addressing the problems with the current law of inequitable conduct.
The Patent Office likely has the rulemaking authority required to implement
certain types of administrative review of inequitable conduct allegations. Indeed,
in 1982 it amended Rule 56 to allow examiners to reject patent applications
during the patent application process based on evidence of inequitable conduct.262
It likely does not have the authority, however, to implement inter partes
postissuance opposition proceedings. 263 If Congress implements inter partes
postissuance opposition proceedings, the Patent Office should consider the
benefits of providing tools to parties and examiners to adjudicate allegations of
inequitable conduct during these proceedings.
C. District Courts
While district courtS264 obviously cannot overturn Federal Circuit or
Supreme Court precedent, they should be allowed to exercise their discretion to
fashion appropriate remedies for inequitable conduct based on the degree of
inappropriate behavior.265 They also should consider shifting attorney fees in
cases where assertions of inequitable conduct are baseless. 266 Moreover, district
courts should amend local patent rules to require professional certifications by
patent attorneys of inequitable conduct assertions.2 67
allegations of inequitable conduct.
261. Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515,
111th Cong. (2009).
262. Notice of Final Rulemaking, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,746,21,746-47 (May 19, 1982).
263. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2006) (granting authority to Patent Office to issue regulations relating
to internal procedure); Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1351-53 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that Patent Office
is limited to procedural rulemaking authority).
264. While I use the term "district courts," I am referring to district courts as well as the Court of
Federal Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction over allegations of patent infringement by the United
States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006) (granting jurisdiction over patent claims against United States to
Court of Federal Claims).
265. See supra Part I.C.1 for a discussion of the proposal to give district courts more power to
assess appropriate remedies.
266. See supra Part IV.C.4 for a discussion of the benefits of a strict liability regime for shifting
attorney fees.
267. See supra Part IV.C.5 for a discussion of the proposal to require patent attorneys to provide




The Federal Circuit was formed in 1982 in part to bring uniformity and
consistency to patent law.268 The Federal Circuit has not taken its role lightly. In
recent years, en banc panels of the Federal Circuit have addressed controversial
and difficult aspects of patent law, including patentability,269 claim
construction,270 and the written description requirement.271 Recently, in
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 272 the Federal Circuit agreed to
address en banc another controversial and difficult aspect of patent law: the
inequitable conduct defense.273
It is helpful that the Federal Circuit will be addressing potential reforms to
the law of inequitable conduct before the Supreme Court does so. Unlike KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 274 in which the Supreme Court granted a petition
for certiorari before the Federal Circuit squarely addressed arguments for reform
of an important and basic area of patent law (nonobviousness), the Federal Circuit
should squarely address arguments for reform of the inequitable conduct defense
before the Supreme Court hears a case addressing the same subject.275 Given that
the doctrine of inequitable conduct as it now exists was developed and articulated
by the Federal Circuit and not the Supreme Court, 276 the Federal Circuit best
268. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 18-24 (1981) (proposing creation of United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
269. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (determining applicable test
for patent-eligibility for process calims), affd, Bilski v. Kappos 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
270. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311-24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (rejecting "rigid
algorithm for claim construction"). But see id. at 1330-35 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (bemoaning Court's
failure to address whether claim construction determinations should be reviewed on appeal for clear
error rather than de novo).
271. See ARIAD Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1343-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc
(concluding that 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2 includes a separate written description requirement).
272. 374 Fed. Appx. 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
273. In particular, the Federal Circuit will address the following six questions:
1. Should the materiality-intent-balancing framework for inequitable conduct be modified or
replaced?
2. If so, how? In particular, should the standard be tied directly to fraud or unclean hands? If
so, what is the appropriate standard for fraud or unclean hands?
3. What is the proper standard for materiality? What role should the United States Patent and
Trademark Office's rules play in defining materiality? Should a finding of materiality require
that but for the alleged misconduct, one or more claims would not have issued?
4. Under what circumstances is it proper to infer intent from materiality?
5. Should the balancing inquiry (balancing materiality and intent) be abandoned?
6. Whether the standards for materiality and intent in other federal agency contexts or at
common law shed light on the appropriate standards to be applied in the patent context.
Therasense, Inc., 374 Fed. Appx. at 35-36 (citations omitted).
274. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
275. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return ofthe Supreme Court to the Bar ofPatents,
2002 Sup. CT. REv. 273, 300-01 (lauding ability of Federal Circuit to thoroughly vet an issue so that it is
"ready for a grant of certiorari").
276. See supra note 178 and accompanying text for a discussion of how inequitable conduct law
primarily has been developed by the Federal Circuit.
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understands the complexities of the current inequitable conduct law, its problems,
and the particular aspects of it that are ripe for improvement. Thus, the Federal
Circuit is the best entity to assess and implement potential reforms.
The Federal Circuit should adopt a "patent fraud" paradigm277 or, at a
minimum, increase the state of mind standard required to prove inequitable
conduct.278 In addition, it should return discretion to district courts to assess
appropriate remedies for inequitable conduct.279 Finally, it should replace its clear
and convincing standard with a preponderance standard for proving invalidity
based on undisclosed, unconsidered material prior art.280
E. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has not considered an allegation of inequitable conduct
in the procurement of a patent outside of fraud,281 and the Supreme Court last
considered a case involving an allegation of fraud in the procurement of a patent
over forty-five years ago.282 Even this most recent case addressed antitrust
liability rather than the inequitable conduct defense.283 Thus, over the last four
and a half decades, various lower courts-most notably the Federal Circuit-have
addressed the doctrine of inequitable conduct and developed it into its current
form without any oversight. It is time for the Supreme Court to reenter the field to
provide that oversight.
Much like the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court has addressed several
important aspects of patent law in the last few years, including the doctrine of
equivalents, 284 the statutory research exemption from infringement, 285 the
intersection of patent and antitrust law, 286  injunctive relief,287  export
277. See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the "patent fraud" concept.
278. See supra Part IV.B for an argument in favor of raising the standard for determining intent to
deceive.
279. See supra Part IV.C.1 for a discussion of the proposal to give district courts more power to
assess appropriate remedies.
280. See supra Part IV.C.3 for a proposal to adopt a preponderance standard for proving invalidity
using unconsidered, material prior art rather than the current standard of clear and convincing
evidence.
281. See Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 318-20 (1949) (affirming district court's conclusion
that Patent Office's decision to disbar patent attorney for participating in defrauding Office was
supported by substantial evidence and based on fair proceeding); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto.
Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 8066, 819 (1945) (affirming district court's conclusion that, because of patent
holder's knowledge or reasonable belief that perjury tainted the patent proceedings, the equitable
doctrine of unclean hands barred enforcement of the patent); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire
Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250 (1944) (holding that, despite passage of nine years, the circuit court had authority
to set aside district court judgment based on later-discovered fraud), overruled on other grounds by
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18-19 (1976); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co.,
290 U.S. 240, 246-47 (1933) (applying doctrine of unclean hands to bar plaintiff from bringing suit).
282. See generally Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
283. Seegenerally id.
284. Festo Corp. v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-42 (2002).
285. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202-08 (2005).
286. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 33-46 (2006).
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infringement,288 obviousness, 289 patent exhaustion,290 and patentability. 291 The
Supreme Court should get its hands dirty in patent law's unclean hands doctrine-
inequitable conduct. The Federal Circuit, however, should be presented with
potential reforms before the Supreme Court grants any petitions for certiorari
addressing this area of the law.292
In particular, the Supreme Court should adopt a "patent fraud" paradigm 293
or, at a minimum, increase the state of mind standard required to prove
inequitable conduct. 294 Like the Federal Circuit, it should return discretion to
district courts to assess appropriate remedies for inequitable conduct.295 It also
should consider the split between the Federal Circuit and various regional circuits
regarding the appropriate burden of proof required to prove invalidity when
material prior art has not been considered by the Patent Office, and it should
adopt a preponderance standard.296
VI. CONCLUSION
The time has come to reform the law of inequitable conduct. While the
inherent information asymmetry between patent applicants and the Patent Office
is a real problem, the solution to that problem-the inequitable conduct defense-
should be something more than just another problem. To serve the public interest
in encouraging patent applicants to disclose important information to the Patent
Office, and to correct for the "plague" of inequitable conduct allegations and their
many tolls, the inequitable conduct defense should be transformed into a tool to
address "patent fraud." In particular, the law should require clear and convincing
evidence meeting both a heightened materiality and heightened state of mind
standard before patents are rendered unenforceable. Other potential reforms-
including returning discretion to the application of remedies for inequitable
conduct, eliminating the clear and convincing standard for proving invalidity
based on material prior art not disclosed or considered by the Patent Office, and
shifting attorney fees when an alleged infringer fails to prove inequitable
287. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-94 (2006).
288. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,442-59 (2007).
289. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,415-22 (2007).
290. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115-22 (2008).
291. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221-24 (2010) (addressing appropriate standard
governing application of 35 U.S.C. § 101); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S.
124,125 (2006) (per curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
292. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the Federal Circuit
should assess reforms to the inequitable conduct doctrine prior to the Supreme Court
293. See supra Part IVA for a discussion of the concept of "patent fraud."
294. See supra Part IV.B for an argument about raising the standard for determining intent to
deceive.
295. See supra Part IV.C.1 for a proposal to give district courts more power to assess appropriate
remedies.
296. See supra Part IV.C.3 for a proposal to replace the current clear and convincing standard for
proving invalidity with a preponderance standard when the Patent Office has not considered material
prior art
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conduct-should also be considered. Congress, the Patent Office, district courts,
the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court should consider all reasonable options
and act.
APPENDIX
Fkqure 1: Ordering Materiality and State of Mind and Identifying Thresholds
Materiality* State of Mind
Hardest to Hardest to
Proet t "Subjective But For" Test Intent rdveProve Prove
"Objective But For" Test Knowledge
---------- ----------
Modern Rule 56 Test Recklessness
...............
"But May Have" Test Gross Negligence
Easiest to "Reasonable Examiner" Easiest to
Prove Test Prove
* The modern Rule 56, "but may have," and "reasonable examiner" materiality tests
include a non-cumulativeness requirement The "subjective but for" test likely includes
this requirement
The dashed line represents "patent fraud" thresholds. "Patent fraud" could be
shown by evidence meeting (1) at least one of the materiality standards above the
dashed line and (2) at least one of the state of mind standards above the dashed line.
The solid line represents the "negligent misrepresentation/omission" thresholds.
"Negligent misrepresentation / omission" might be shown by evidence meeting (1) at
least one of the materiality standards above the solid line but below the dashed line
and (2) at least one of the state of mind standards above the solid line but below the
dashed line.
Under the current law, inequitable conduct can be shown by evidence meeting (1)
at least one of the materiality standards above the dashed line and (2) at least one of
the state of mind standards above the solid line, or by evidence meeting (1) at least one
of the materiality standards above the solid line and (2) at least one of the state of
mind standards above the dashed line.
The dotted line represents the adoption of a heightened state of mind
standard for inequitable conduct. Using this heightened state of mind standard,
inequitable conduct could be shown by evidence meeting (1) at least one of the
materiality standards above the dashed line and (2) at least one of the state of
mind standards above the dotted line, or by evidence meeting (1) at least one of
the materiality standards above the solid line and (2) at least one of the state of
mind standards above the dashed line.
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Figure 2: Balancing Materiality and State of Mind and Proposing Proportional
Remedies
Mateialty* Stateof Mind Legal Conclusion R ImLdy
Potential WalkerProcesAntitruste Unenforceability of
"Subjective But Vlo ni"atet Patent(s); Attorney
For" Test or Intent or Frad"; Hegtene Fees; Potential
"Objective But Knowledge Ineu itab end Damages for
For" Test Walker ProcessCurrent Inequitable Antitrust Violation
Conduct
"Subjective But Heightened Unenforceability of
For" Test or Inequitable Conduct; Patent; Attorney
"Objective But Current Inequitable
For" Test Conduct
"Subjective But
For" Test or gro Current Inequitable Unenforceability of
Negligence, or
"Objective But Negligence Conduct Patent
For" Test
Modern Rule 56 Heightened
Test, "But May Intent or Inequitable Conduct; Unenforceability ofHave" Test, or Knowledge Current Inequitable Patent
"Reasonable
Examiner" Test
Modern Rule 56 No Clear and
Test, "But May r ss "Negligent Convincing
Have" Test, or Misrepresentation / Invalidity StandardHave"igence, or
"Reasonable Negligence Omission" (Potential
Examiner" Test N Invalidity)#
Any None No Misconduct None#+
None Any No Misconduct None,
* The modern Rule 56, "but may have," and "reasonable examiner" materiality
tests include a non-cumulativeness requirement. The "subjective but for" test likely
includes this requirement.
# An alternative to a "negligent misrepresentation / omission" defense would
be to replace the clear and convincing invalidity standard with a preponderance
invalidity standard for prior art not disclosed or considered by the Patent Office
and meeting any materiality standard, without any state of mind requirement. This
alternative could reduce the "plague" of inequitable conduct assertions while
supporting the duty of candor and good faith. See supra Part IV.C.1 for a proposal
to give district courts more power to assess appropriate remedies in inequitable
conduct cases.
* One possibility is to shift attorney fees to parties unable to prove
misconduct. This also would help reduce the "plague" of inequitable conduct
assertions. See supra Part IV.C.4 for a discussion of the benefits of adopting a strict
liability standard for shifting attorney fees.
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